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Preface 
 
 
Complex technological systems that perform reliably most of the time, 
fail unexpectedly and dramatically sometimes. Examples abound: the 
accidents with the space shuttles Challenger and Columbia, 
Chernobyl, the ferries Herald of Free Enterprise and Estonia, several 
civilian airliners, the Piper Alpha disaster and its Norwegian 
counterpart in terms of human lives lost in the North Sea offshore 
industry: Alexander Kielland. In recent years Norway experienced 
several unexpected large scale accidents involving complex 
technological systems: the crash, in 1997,of a Super Puma helicopter 
(LN-OPG) en route to the floating oil production platform at the 
Norne field, the loss of MS Sleipner at Store Bloksen in 1999, the 
train collision near Åsta on the Røros line in 2000. Despite the major 
differences in types of technology involved, what all these examples 
have in common is that the organizations that operated the various 
complex technological systems were not able to maintain functional 
and technical integrity; they were not able to maintain performative 
closure. 
 Many of these accidents result in public inquiries; when there is 
environmental damage or when human lives are lost. These 
investigations generate information and materials about company 
internal mechanisms and processes that would otherwise not be 
available to ‘outsiders’. Hence, these large scale accidents are 
strategic research sites for those who want to study issues of safety 
and risk, of reliability and vulnerability of complex technological 
systems. 
 As sites for collective and public learning from these failures, 
public inquiries and other post-accident investigations that are 
conducted in the immediate aftermath of a large scale accident have 
their limitations and pitfalls. First, many post-accident investigations 
start from the assumption that a fundamental error or a serious 
violation of safety regulations must have been ‘committed’. Or that 
there was a random mechanical or technical failure, also a deviation 
from some ideal state. Without such an error, breach of regulations or 
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random technical failure the system would have continued to perform 
reliably. Much of the investigative efforts go into the localization and 
fixing of the error or deviation. This basic assumption is rarely 
questioned. It is rarely questioned because, as a secondary process, the 
investigation starts from disastrous outcomes. The paradoxical 
conclusion that, in the primary process of the work, there was no 
error, or that the failure resulted from doing the job as good as 
possible, does not easily emerge. Errors and other deviations are 
reconstructed in the secondary process of the post-accident 
investigation. Often it is not at all evident that they could have been 
recognized as ‘contributing causes’ – to an outcome that has not yet 
occurred - in and from the perspective of the primary process of work. 
 Second, in large scale accidents involving complex 
technological systems the damages sustained are grave. Human lives 
are lost. Invested capital is lost. The system is no longer available for 
the production and delivery of goods or the provision of services. 
Legally binding regularity requirements can no longer be met. Issues 
of criminal and civil liability dominate the aftermath of large scale 
accidents. Public inquiries and other post-accident investigations can 
not be divorced from this process. Even when they present themselves 
as pure fact-finding missions, the attribution of causality that they 
perform – through the reconstruction, localization and fixing of errors 
and other deviations - is intimately linked with the attribution and 
distribution of responsibility and liability. However, accident 
investigation reports do not ‘conclude’ liability issues. These may 
continue for years after the accident, keeping information under lock 
and hampering further public understanding and learning from large 
scale accidents. 
 For these reasons it may be worthwhile to revisit large scale 
accidents a couple of years later, when liability issues have been 
settled, when reports that were confidential have been released and 
become publicly available. And when people involved in the primary 
process can think and talk about their work without legal restrictions. 
The general questions that we should put to these accidents are: Why 
were the organizations that operated the complex technological 
systems involved not able to maintain performative closure? What in 
the dynamics of the system made them loose that ability to achieve 
5 
and maintain functional and technical integrity under the specific 
circumstances leading up to the accident? In other words, what made 
them vulnerable? The term vulnerability, as it is used here, refers to a 
reduced ability to anticipate, resist, cope with or recover from ‘events’ 
that threaten the achievement or maintenance of performative closure. 
 
This study puts these questions about the vulnerability of complex 
technological systems to the loss of the gravity base structure (GBS) 
for Sleipner A in 1991. In August 1991 Norwegian Contractors (NC) 
lost the concrete GBS for the Sleipner A Condeep-platform while it 
was being prepared for deck mating. Fortunately no human lives were 
lost and there was no environmental damage. Hence, there was no 
public inquiry into the accident. Both Statoil and Norwegian 
Contractors established corporate accident investigation committees.  
Although there was no wreck to be recovered for the purpose of 
technical investigations, the immediate causal chain of events has 
been reconstructed in numerical models and sinking scenarios and in 
full-scale models of sections of the structure. This work put tricell 
geometry and the shape, dimensions and placement of reinforcement 
steel in these areas into focus. 
Soon after the accident both NC’s and Statoil’s conclusions 
gravitated towards ‘fundamental errors’ made by NC’s design team in 
the global analysis for the platform. The direction and focus of these 
early conclusions were due to two factors: a) both NC’s and Statoil’s 
primary interest in finding the immediate causes of the loss in order to 
be able to correct them and build a new platform, Sleipner A2, as soon 
as possible, and b) an early decision in legal circles to focus the 
liability case on Aker Maritime owned Norwegian Contractors - the 
main contractor on Sleipner – and to exempt all subcontractors from 
financial liability. 
The civil liability procedures dominated investigations into the 
Sleipner A GBS Loss for 6 years, until finally the liability issue was 
settled out of court in 1997. By that time, however, Norwegian 
Contractors had been dismantled and the ‘fundamental error’ 
conclusion had frozen into the few records that were publicly 
available.  However, Sleipner A was number 12 in a series of concrete 
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gravity base structures that the company had built since the middle of 
the 1970. On several accounts Sleipner A was a moderate one. NC had 
developed a reputation of being able to deliver these mega-
construction projects on time and on site. In spite of the early 
‘fundamental error’ conclusions, the question of why a top 
entrepreneurial company like Norwegian Contractors failed on a 
relatively moderate assignment like Sleipner A is still poorly 
understood, at least as far as publicly available records and accounts 
are concerned. This is the question that is of central concern here. It is 
a question that asks for a better (public) understanding of the 
processes that were behind, or better, that produced the set of 
‘immediate causes’ as they have been reconstructed after the accident 
in 1991. It is a question that asks for the ways in which Norwegian 
Contractors had become vulnerable. 
Although I have worked in complex technological systems, and 
have studied several others, I am not an engineer. Several of the 
engineers that were involved in the design of Sleipner A were very 
patient in explaining the engineering issues to me in extended 
interviews. The presentation of these engineering issues in this study 
reflects my understanding of them. Furthermore, as a matter of 
presentation in a written paper alone, some degree of simplification is 
inevitable. I am responsible for any ´errors´ or oversimplification that 
remain. The text of a study must be concluded at some point because 
it must be sent to the printer. The empirical research may continue, 
however. There are some empirical questions that I have not yet been 
able to establish. I am flagging them in footnotes. I hope to fill out 
these gaps in later versions of the study. The most important message 
of this study, however, is in the structure and conclusions of the 
narrative of the Sleipner A GBS loss as I am telling it. A narrative that 
in its conclusions runs counter to the ´fundamental error´ account that 
has frozen into what is available in terms of  public records, into 
stories as they are told and retold until today and  into the teaching of 
new generations of Norwegian engineers at technical universities. 
Final, definite accounts do not exists. Alternative accounts are always 
possible. Learning occurs in the active confrontation of and discussion 
among alternative accounts. Or, as Kristian Bredesen puts it in his 
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book on the 1999 MS Sleipner accident at Store Bloksen: ‘The best 
thing about a book is not its contents but the thoughts that it shapes’. 
 
May 2004 
Ger Wackers 
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Chapter 1 
 
The 1991 Sleipner A GBS loss 
 
 
1.1. The unimaginable happens  
 
On August 23, 1991, seismological stations in southern Norway 
registered a vibration with a force of 3 on Richter’s scale. 
Investigations identified the cause of the vibration: a concrete offshore 
production platform (Sleipner A), that was under construction and 
being prepared for ‘deck mating’, sprang a leak, capsized, imploded 
on its way down and hit the seafloor as a mass of rubble and bend 
reinforcement steel in Gandsfjorden near Stavanger (Holand 1997).  
Norwegian Contractors (NC), was building Sleipner A at its 
construction site at Hinna in Stavanger, for Statoil, the Norwegian 
state oil company. 
Alert Gaard, Statoil’s engineering manager on the Sleipner A 
project – being in charge in the absence (holiday) of the project 
director – received a phone call from the company’s site 
representative at Hinna ‘with the unbelievable news that what never 
could happen had happened’ (Gaard 1992: 3). The impact of concrete 
and steel did not only rock the seafloor, it also rocked the reputation, 
if not the confidence, of one of Norway’s top entrepreneurial and 
construction firms in the offshore industry. For Statoil the loss of 
Sleipner implied a considerable set back in the development of the 
Sleipner gas field. Sleipner A was to be the first production 
installation on the field and Statoil was committed to start production 
on the first of October 1993. The loss of invested capital was so huge 
that any liability claim, when awarded, could easily topple not only 
Norwegian Contractors, but also Aker Maritime, the major Norwegian 
offshore engineering company that was the full owner of NC. Prior to 
this unimaginable event Norwegian Contractors had never lost a 
platform. To the contrary, over the years, they had developed a high 
degree of confidence in their ability to deliver these huge structures 
on-site and on time.  
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1.2. Solutions in concrete 
Since the early days of oil and gas field developments in the North 
Sea offshore industry (in the early 1970s) Norwegian Contractors had 
offered ‘solutions in concrete’ to oil companies.1 NC’s reputation was 
based on their ability to produce and deliver on-site and on-time so-
called Condeep platforms: the load bearing and supporting base 
structure of a fixed platform standing on the seafloor. A typical 
Condeep consisted of a set of cylindrical cells constituting the foot of 
the structure, some of which – varying from 1 – 4 in number – were 
elongated into tall shafts extending above the sea water level and 
supporting the topside structure with decks, installations and 
accommodation2. As a company Norwegian Contractors developed a 
self-aware confidence in their ability to build these huge concrete 
structures and in their capacity to tackle and solve any major problem 
that might arise in the process. 
                                                 
1 The building of the Ekofisk tank in 1973, on a contract for a French firm, C.G. 
Doris, established concrete as a building material offshore and the partnership of 
three Norwegian entrepreneurial firms (AF Høyer Ellefsen, F. Selmer and Thor 
Furuholmen) that formed Norwegian Contractors as a reliable partner (Steen 
1993). 
2 The basic concept of the Condeep platforms is as simple as it is ingenious. The 
large cylindrical cells of the GBS displace so much water to generate sufficient 
upward pressure to support the weight of the concrete structure itself and the 
weight of the topside installations. The bottoms were constructed in a dry-dock, 
towed out to deep water after which the cells and shafts were built in a 
continuous process of slip forming while being afloat; that is, concrete structures 
as high as the Eiffel Tower. After deck mating the platforms were towed out to 
the destined site in the North Sea, put on the sea floor, and hooked up to oil or 
gas wells. In the summer of 1975 NC had four of these mega-projects under 
various phases of construction simultaneously: Beryl A, Brent B, Statfjord A 
and Brent D. They would accomplish the same feat again between 1993 and 
1995. In 1988 Norwegian Contractors was awarded the international Offshore 
Petroleum Conference’s Distinguished Achievement Award for their 
contributions in advancing the design and fabrication of concrete offshore 
structures. 
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Sleipner A was number 12 in the series of ‘gravity3 base 
structures’ (GBS) of the Condeep-type built by Norwegian 
Contractors. And it was a relatively small one. During the 1980’s NC 
had built the Gullfaks-series, with 262 meter high Gullfaks C 
(standing in 200 meters deep water) being the largest Condeep ever 
built, that is in terms of volume of concrete. Construction of the tallest 
one, 369 meters high Troll (to stand in 300 meters deep water) had 
just started in July 1991.4 Sleipner A was designed to stand in 89 
meters of water and the concrete GBS (to the top of the four shafts) 
would be 110 meters high.  
 
1.3. Research question and up front conclusion:  
No Error! 
Why did a top firm like Norwegian Contractors – that was good at 
what it was doing - fail on a moderate assignment like Sleipner A? 
This will be the leading research question throughout this study. 
I will offer my main conclusion up front and use the remainder 
of the study to make good on that claim: There was NO ERROR! 
NC’s failing on this moderate assignment resulted from doing the job 
as good as possible.  NC’s design team did not violate a set of well-
established, deterministic rules, that is rules providing detailed 
instructions on how the job is to be performed; deterministic rules that 
would provide an unambiguous frame of reference defining violations 
or transgressions of these rules as errors. Rules and regulations 
underlying the design and engineering of constructions in concrete for 
offshore applications were not deterministic. They constrained 
possibilities, but also delineated a space for further adaptive 
improvement and optimization, meeting local and emergent criteria 
for good work and resonating positively with performance criteria in 
other parts of the company and in other companies. NC’s design team 
                                                 
3 The word gravity here implies that these platforms, after on site installation, 
stand directly on the seafloor being stabilized by their own weight, without any 
additional support structures (Hjelde 1979: 4). 
4 The Shell-NC contract for Troll, signed on March 21 1991, was at the time 
Norway’s largest industrial contract ever (Steen 1993: 134). 
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optimized the design according to local standards and sound 
engineering judgment. Specific design solutions passed through 
various forms and levels of (ISO 9000 certified) quality checks and 
external revisions, until they were put to the final test by the physical 
environment of the deep water of Gandsfjorden. 
This conclusion implies that I am not subscribing to the 
explanation saying that NC failed on Sleipner A because they assigned 
a B-team of not-their-best to the job – the A-team being drawn to the 
much more prestigious, because tallest-ever, Troll-project, for which 
the contract had been signed half a year before the Sleipner contract. 
Neither do I subscribe to hubristic explanations saying that NC’s 
failure was due to misplaced confidence in their own abilities and that 
they did not take this project, moderate in terms of size and water 
depth when measured against the volume of concrete in Gullfaks C 
and the height of Troll, serious enough. NC’s self-confidence was 
grounded in a historical record of completing and delivering eleven of 
these mega-construction projects on time and on site – twelve if we 
include the Ekofisk tank. 
However, my conclusion runs counter to the main conclusions of 
published engineering accounts speaking of ‘fundamental errors’ in 
the global analysis and in the detailing of reinforcement steel.  The 
‘discrepancy’ in conclusions has to do with a) features of the accident-
investigation process and b) with my own (re)framing of the design 
process in terms of an adaptive search process; of networks of 
organizations like Norwegian Contractors and its commissioning 
companies and subcontractors, in terms of complex adaptive systems. 
I will address these issues in chapters two and three respectively, 
before moving on to a detailed analysis of the Sleipner A design 
process. 
This study is part of a larger project on issues of reliability and 
vulnerability in complex technological systems in the North Sea 
offshore industry.  Accidents provide important ‘strategic research 
sites’ (Bijker et al. 1987) where these issues are researchable. In a 
number of case studies I am looking for patterns of mechanisms that 
can help us in understanding unexpected failures in complex 
technological systems (Wackers and Kørte 2003). From these case 
studies we might be able to derive alternative approaches to accident 
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investigations and to proactive monitoring tools aiming for condition 
oriented ‘vulnerability profiling’, rather than consequence oriented 
and event based quantitative risk analysis. 
 
1.4. Sources 
Because no human lives were lost in the SLA GBS Loss and because 
there was no environmental damage, there was no ‘public inquiry’ 
into the accident. Hence there is no public inquiry report. There are 
only a few published accounts in technical engineering journals.  The 
analysis and account of the Sleipner A GBS Loss in this study  is 
based on a variety of sources. First, there is a set of technical reports 
commissioned by Statoil from SINTEF. These reports were made 
publicly available in 1997. Second, I have been given access to 
company internal accident investigation reports produced by 
Norwegian Contractors and Statoil respectively in the weeks and 
months following the accident. I have also been given access to a 
report compiled in 1995 by the Sleipner A design team in response to 
many of the accusations directed at them in the civil liability 
procedures. Finally, I have conducted a series of interviews with 
(former) Norwegian Contractor engineers involved in the design and 
construction of Sleipner A. 
 
1.5. Structure of the study 
Chapter 2 describes some characteristics of the accident investigation 
process into the Sleipner A GBS Loss. These features explain the 
focal nature of the fundamental error type of conclusion, limiting the 
location of the problem to NC’s design team and the time of the 
problem to a couple of months in an extended process that covered 
several years. The chapter introduces an important distinction between 
primary (every day work) and secondary (post-accident investigation) 
processes. In a sense, the chapter clears the way for alternative 
accounts. This study makes a conscious effort to focus on the primary 
processes of the design and engineering work. 
Chapter 3, then, proceeds by introducing a conceptual 
framework that allows us to describe and analyze the primary process 
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of the Sleipner A design and engineering work in terms of an 
adaptive, optimizing up-hill search on a fitness landscape. The units of 
analysis are adaptive performance systems and the achievement of 
performative closure (in task or goal accomplishment) is an important 
feature with regard to selection processes. This is a conceptual 
framework that can be applied across levels, or at different levels of 
aggregation. Chapter 3 illustrates this perspective by recounting and 
reframing in these terms the history of Norwegian Contractors at the 
level of the company. In doing so, the chapter ‘unfreezes’ the focal 
fundamental error type of conclusion, expanding the space of 
processes and mechanisms that might be of relevance for a proper 
understanding of the Sleipner A GBS Loss. Simultaneously the 
chapter ‘sets the stage’ for the subsequent chapters that apply this 
perspective ‘one level lower than the level of the company’, to the 
design work performed by NC’s design team and the engineering 
work performed by its subcontractors. 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 take issue with a number of features in 
which Sleipner A was different from previous Condeep-projects. 
These are the adaptive changes aiming at improved performance that 
come into focus when applying the conceptual framework introduced 
in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 covers some adaptive changes that were made 
before the contract between Statoil and Norwegian Contractors was 
signed. Chapter 5 covers issues that have to do with the global 
analysis (design), whereas chapter 6 covers adaptive changes in the 
translation of the outcomes of the global analysis into dimensions and 
placement of reinforcement steel, drawings and material lists 
(engineering). 
Chapter 7 tries to develop some of the lessons that can be 
learned from this account of the Sleipner A GBS Loss. 
 
 
15 
 
Chapter 2 
Avoiding post-accident optical effects 
 
 
NO ERROR! Failure through optimization! A paradoxical conclusion, 
indeed, that runs counter to accounts that speak of fundamental errors 
that have been committed.  To clear the way for an alternative account 
we must address some features of the accident investigation process 
through which these ‘fundamental error’ conclusions were established.  
 
2.1. Primary and secondary processes 
First of all it is important to recognize the distinction between primary 
and secondary processes. In constructivist science and technology 
studies this is a familiar notion (Latour 1979: 134). Primary processes 
are the actual, real-time work processes prior to the accident, as they 
are performed and experienced (or lived) by the engineers and 
construction workers in the flow of the work. Secondary processes are 
the activities of the post-accident investigations looking for the causes 
of the failure and loss. These activities involve a different group of 
people who were not involved in the primary process. Independent 
accident investigation committees are set up. National and 
international experts and consultants are brought in to scrutinize the 
primary process and identify the errors constituting the (immediate) 
causes of the failure. Once the errors have been ‘dis- or uncovered’ it 
seems as if they have always been there, committed but undiscovered 
in the flow of work. When the ‘errors’ are deemed to be ‘fundamental’ 
there often is amazement: How can they – the primary process people 
– not have seen this? However, when you try to ‘look through the 
eyes’ of the people involved in the primary process the ‘errors’ are not 
at all ‘easy to see’: there are NO ERRORS, not in the primary process. 
The errors are reconstructed in the secondary processes of post-
accident investigations.  
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Of course, the analysis and account in this chapter also builds on 
secondary process work, or rather third process work. In a 
methodological sense, this account self-consciously puts the primary 
process into focus. However, from our position, more then 10 years 
after the SLA GBS loss, we can also consider the post-accident 
investigations performed immediately after the accident. 
 
2.2. Identifying the immediate causal mechanism 
On August 23, 1991, 22 people were on the platform when the first 
bang was heard and water rushed uncontrolled into one of the four 
shafts (D3). Ballast pumps were started immediately but their capacity 
was not sufficient. The people were evacuated and it took 18 minutes 
for the platform to capsize and sink. Video images from a remotely 
controlled submarine sent down showed a pile of concrete rubble and 
bent reinforcement steel, partially buried in the sand on the seafloor. 
The structure imploded on its way down. There was nothing to 
recover for technical investigations. Both the main contractor, NC, 
and the owner, Statoil established corporate accident investigation 
committees.5 
Bernt Jakobsen, one of NC’s senior engineers, recalled a session 
with NC’s accident investigation committee in which they were 
presented with the geometry and the design details of the tricells: the 
triangular spaces (interstices) that arise when you put circular 
cylinders together.6 Knowing about the outcome, and being presented 
- in the context of an accident investigation - with the tricell’s 
geometry, he recognized that the tricell corner provided negative 
supports for the tricell/shaft walls, given the open connection with the 
ambient water through the hole in the top-domes of the tricells. He 
also recognized the special demands a negative support situation put 
                                                 
5 Because no lives were lost and because there was no environmental damage, 
no ‘public inquiry’ was conducted. Hence, for the 1991 SLA GBS Loss there is 
no public inquiry report.  
6 Until then the committee had considered all possible causes of the leak, like for 
example sites in which large tubes and risers penetrated the concrete walls and 
domes of the shafts. 
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on the design and placement of reinforcements in the corners. This 
focused the committee’s efforts on the tricells. Recalculations 
performed in Trondheim by SINTEF - using different software 
packages - gave results that were significantly higher than the 
calculations performed by NC’s design team. Or conversely, NC’s 
results underestimated shear forces with some 43 %. SINTEF’s results 
where confirmed in full-scale tests in a construction testing facility in 
Borås, in Sweden (Tomaszewicz: 1997). On the basis of eyewitness 
accounts and numerical simulations several sinking scenarios were 
developed, making assumptions about the most probable site and size 
of the leak (Oldervik 1997). 
This work resulted in the establishment of a probable causal 
mechanism: when the pressure difference across the tri-cell/D3-shaft 
wall exceeded a critical point - during the controlled submergence of 
the platform in preparation of deck-mating – one or more cracks 
formed that propagated around the reinforcement steel through the 
whole thickness of the wall, allowing water from the tricells, that were 
in open connection with the sea, to rush in.  
The two accident investigation committees were confident that 
they had identified the (immediate) causal mechanism of the loss. I 
will not take issue with these technical reconstructions and 
investigations. In my analysis I will accept these conclusions as a 
matter of fact. 
 
2.3 Easy to see? 
From these investigations it was also concluded that NC’s design team 
had made some fundamental errors in the global (finite element) 
analysis – that is, in the calculation of stresses and forces – of the 
platform, resulting in errors in the translation of these forces into size, 
shape, number and placement of reinforcement steel. This is the 
account that you will find in several of the technical papers on the 
Sleipner A GBS Loss either published or presented at various 
conferences (Gaard 1992; Jakobsen 1994; Jakobsen & Rosendahl 
1994; Collins et al. 1997). Gudmestad, Aas Warland and Stead (1993: 
6) wrote: 
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It was documented that this accident was caused by: 
- error in the finite element analysis; 
- error in reinforcement detailing. 
 
In an interview, a professor in marine engineering at the technical 
university in Trondheim, expressed the severity of the error like this: 
‘Any second year civil engineering student with a slide ruler checking 
the outcomes of the calculations would have seen that they couldn’t be 
right!’ But is it? Is it that easy to see? The answer is YES when you 
are confronted with the failure and after the secondary process has 
(re)constructed the error for you. The answer is NO when you look at 
the primary processes: NO ERROR. 
 
2.4. Optical effects 
The post-accident focal emphasis on these ‘errors’ in a design and 
engineering process that was lengthy in time and spread over many 
sites in a network of companies and consultants, was the result of an 
‘optical effect’. The direction and focus of these early conclusions 
were due to two factors. 
First, both NC’s and Statoil’s primary interest was in finding the 
immediate causes of the loss in order to be able to correct them and 
build a new platform, Sleipner A2, as soon as possible.  Statoil was 
committed by contracts with large customers to start production of and 
deliver natural gas from the Sleipner field by the 1st of October 1993. 
These contractual obligations were not suspended because of the loss 
of the gravity base structure of the first production platform for the 
field.  Redoing the whole design and engineering process would take 
too much time. Rebuilding the platform using basically the same 
design was preferable, that is, if local, specific errors could be 
identified and corrected. 
Second, an early decision was made in legal circles to focus the 
civil liability case on Aker Maritime owned Norwegian Contractors – 
the main contractor on Sleipner – and to exempt all subcontractors 
from financial liability.  One of the owners of the Sleipner field license 
had no insurance coverage for the capital investments required for the 
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development of the field.  The only way for this oil company to 
recover some of the invested capital lost in the accident was through a 
civil liability procedure.7 The size of the claim was such that the only 
company from which such an amount could be reclaimed was Aker 
Maritime. Even for Aker Maritime an obligation to pay the full 
amount of the claim could well have caused bankruptcy of the 
company.  The civil liability procedures dominated investigations into 
the Sleipner A GBS Loss for 6 years, until finally the liability issue 
was settled out of court in 1997. 
 These two factors defined the nature and the locus of the 
problem: they brought the design work performed by NC’s SLA-
design team during a couple of months in the fall of 1988 and winter 
1989 into focus, identifying it as the site and time of the problem, 
simultaneously reducing and simplifying it by fixing the cause of the 
failure in and to the work performed in the global analysis.  As a result 
of the typically dual effect of tracing the boundaries of a problem 
definition (Callon 1980), they defined a large part of the platform 
production process as not-relevant for the understanding of why 
Norwegian Contractors failed on a moderate assignment like Sleipner 
A. An important task in this study is to enlarge the scope of relevant 
mechanisms and processes and to bring into view again what has been 
forgotten or suppressed – at least in the publicly available accounts - 
in and through the reductionist and simplifying ‘fundamental error’ 
explanations (Law & Mol 2002: 3). 
 As is often the case, financial liability procedures put a legal 
filter on information that is released to the public domain. Company 
lawyers are adamant about any information or statement that could be 
interpreted as an admission of liability. Early publications in 
engineering journals had to be approved by Statoil. SINTEF’s series 
of technical reports remained classified until the out-of-court 
settlement of the liability issue in 1997. As a company Norwegian 
Contractors was dismantled two years earlier, in 1995, that is:  after 
the completion of Sleipner A2, Troll, Draugen and Heidrun – between 
1992 and 1995 NC had four of these mega-projects under construction 
                                                 
7 Police investigations concluded that there was no evidence to suggest some 
form of criminal negligence that would warrant prosecution according to 
criminal law. 
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simultaneously. After the out-of-court settlement of the liability case 
the more fundamental causes of NC’s failure have not been re-
addressed. In public domain sources the ‘fundamental error’ 
conclusion remains the standard account. It is this account that this 
study takes issue with. 
  
2.5. Shifting perspective 
In order to understand how NC failed by doing a good job as possible 
we will have to avoid the specific optical effects of the secondary, 
post-accident process investigations and look at the primary processes. 
To do so we will need to enlarge the scope and shift our perspective 
with a different set of conceptual tools to help us recognize the 
relevant processes and mechanisms that have been suppressed and 
forgotten. These conceptual tools should allow us to appreciate that: 
1) each Condeep-platform is a unique product that has to be 
adapted to a) the specific  natural seafloor characteristics and 
water depths of its intended site, including the forces of highest 
waves or fiercest storms that the platform must resist during its 
lifetime, b) the specifics of the installations required for 
production, processing of and storage of the gas or oil in the 
reservoir, together determining the weight of the topside, c) the 
economic climate (oil and gas prices, profit margins, cash flow,  
overall field development costs), and d) the time left to preset 
and intended start of production.  
2) multiple companies and consultants are involved in the process, 
performing different roles and tasks over an extended period of 
time, having different responsibilities. 
I found concepts meeting these requirements in recent work in 
complexity theory. I will introduce them briefly in the next chapter - 
while simultaneously enlarging the scope of relevant processes - and 
then use them in the account of the Sleipner A design process in 
subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter 3 
Adaptation, interaction and culture 
 
This chapter has a dual purpose. First, it will introduce a core set of 
concepts – drawn from the field of complexity theory - that will allow 
us to recognize the adaptive and emergent processes that have been 
suppressed in the ‘fundamental error’ accounts that are publicly 
available. Second, it will take steps in ‘enlarging the scope’ through 
the demonstration of the heuristic value of these concepts with 
examples from Norwegian Contractor’s history and organizational 
structure. 
Complexity theory8 is a theory of the emergence of global 
patterns – or forms or structures – from local interactions. Originating 
in mathematics and theoretical physics (Waldrop 1992) it is now 
translated into a wide range of disciplines, from biology and brain 
research (Solé & Goodwin 2000) to sociology, organizational theory, 
business and management studies (Eve et al. 1997; Marion 1999; 
Sherman and Schultz 1998; Stacey 2000; Streatfield 2001). Together 
complexity theorists cover a wide range of phenomena, ranging from 
morphogenesis, that is the emergence of (anatomical) forms in 
biological organisms (Goodwin 1994), the origin of life and of 
ecosystems (Kauffman 1993; 1995), synchronization in biological 
systems (oscillators) as well as physical and social systems (Strogatz 
2003) to the exploration of emergent behavior in agent-based 
(computer) models (Holland 1994: 1998) and in real-world, evolving 
networks (Barabási 2002). Complexity theorists are fascinated by self-
organizing, enduring or transient patterns, whether they are ant hills, 
the human immune system, cities or other forms of social 
organization, that is, in forms of order that do not require a central, 
coordinating agent neither to produce nor to explain their global 
                                                 
8 Complexity theory is not a single or unified theory. It is rather a set of 
theoretical ideas and approaches that share a similar outlook on and interest in 
the dynamics of systems exhibiting emergent behaviour. For reasons of 
convenience, however, I will use the term complexity theory in the singular. 
Other authors speak about complexity thinking or non-linear thinking. 
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behavior (Johnson 2001). This is not to deny that in social systems 
and organizations human actors have intentions, motives or strategies, 
however, these are not sufficient to explain the global behavior of the 
system. Complexity theory is a theory of complex adaptive systems 
(CAS), comprised of individual (adaptive) agents; agents that take 
different shapes, depending of the level of aggregation and 
description.  From this body of work we can derive several concepts 
that can be fruitfully applied in the analysis of the Sleipner A design 
process.  
 
3.1. Landscapes 
Landscapes of valleys, ridges, foothills and mountains are useful 
images to visualize and think about the dynamic behavior of complex 
adaptive systems (Abraham and Shaw 1992: 47 ff.).  As a geometric 
model, the landscape represents an abstract space of all possible states 
that a system can be in. The actual state of a system represents a point 
on that virtual landscape. Adaptive changes in the system’s state trace 
a trajectory on the surface of the landscape.  
 Basically, landscapes come in two forms: as energy landscapes 
and as fitness landscapes. Energy landscapes have their origin in 
physics. The valleys represent low energy states. The ridges and high-
country hills represent high-energy states, separating basins of lower 
energy. The slopes, or better, the steepness of the slopes, represent 
energy gradients.  In its most general formulation, energy is ‘some 
kind of function that is minimized through the dynamics’ (Solé and 
Goodwin 2000: 126) We can think of energy in terms of costs, effort 
or work. An organization settling into a routine mode of production 
can be seen as moving down along the slope (gradient) of a valley 
towards an energy minimum where it can perform its tasks effectively 
and efficiently, that is, for the lowest costs and communicative effort 
possible. We can also think of disciplines as occupying different 
valleys in an energy landscape. On the basis of shared conventions, 
common understanding and a specialized, technical vocabulary 
communication within a discipline requires little effort, whereas 
communication across disciplinary boundaries (the high energy 
ridges) requires a considerable amount of effort. Energy landscapes 
23 
are used in several specialized fields making extensive use of 
computer modeling, for example in pattern recognition by neural 
networks. The process of pattern recognition (of a corrupted pattern) 
is visualized as a downhill movement to the bottom of energy valleys 
representing a given memory state (previously learned pattern) (Solé 
& Goodwin 2000: 127-8). In a quite different field, Axelrod (1997: 72 
ff.), a political scientist, uses a landscape theory (of aggregation) in his 
work on the formation of coalitions, alliances and organizational 
structures. 
 Fitness landscapes have their origin in theoretical, evolutionary 
biology. In fitness landscapes the vertical dimension represents higher 
or lower fitness. Fitness is low in the valleys and high on the ridges 
and peaks. Biologists like Wright and Jacob thought of the evolution 
of life as adaptation through small changes involving a local search in 
the space of possibilities. The image is one of local hill climbing via 
fitter mutants toward some local or global optimum in a fitness 
landscape (Kauffman 1993: 33). But not all changes are beneficial. 
Some result in lower fitness and a downhill move on the surface of the 
landscape. Fitness landscapes also provide a framework for thinking 
about the difference between exploitation and exploration (March 
1991). Exploitation refers to a reliance on features and ways of doing 
that proved to be successful and improving on them to climb further 
towards, or to stay on the top of the current hill. Exploration, then, 
refers to changes that perhaps result in lower fitness in the short run 
but that allows searches in the landscape for fitness optima that might 
be higher than the current one. Radical and risky innovations 
constitute ‘long jumps’ across the fitness landscape (Kauffman 1995: 
193). 
 Fitness landscapes are not static or fixed. They are dynamic and 
flexible. The number, size, shape and position of peaks and valleys 
depend on the adaptive strategies of agents in the same field. The 
emergence or entrance of a competitor produces changes in the fitness 
landscape. Dramatic events like the OPEC-induced 1973 energy crisis 
warp the landscape altogether, causing severe crisis in one place and 
creating new opportunities in another. 
 It is easy to see why thinking in terms of complexity and fitness 
landscapes should appeal to scholars in organization theory and 
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management (Stacey 2000: 291 ff.; Sherman & Schultz 1998). 
Innovative companies seem to be the archetypical complex adaptive 
systems in the social and economic realm. In highly competitive 
markets, with shrinking product life cycles and decreasing times to 
market, ‘the businesses that succeed are those that are first within the 
industry to see an adjacent opportunity and act upon it’ (Sherman & 
Schultz 1998: 23). The primary interest is in ways to exploit insights 
in complex, emergent behavior to devise new managerial strategies for 
the benefit of an organization’s competitiveness, profitability and 
survivability, that is to ‘harness complexity’ (Axelrod & Cohen 2000). 
Little attention, however, has been given to the ‘downside’ of this 
adaptive behavior, that is, to the ways in which adaptive search 
strategies that aim for improvement also induce system 
vulnerabilities.9 
 The notion of fitness landscapes can be used across levels of 
aggregation. In subsequent chapters of this study my focus will be on 
the level of NC’s SLA-design team, one level of aggregation lower 
than the level of NC as a company. Before moving down, let me use 
an overview of the history of Norwegian Contractors to illustrate the 
heuristic value of the notion of fitness landscapes, while, at the same 
time, taking a first step to enlarge the scope of relevant processes 
leading up to the 1991 loss of the Sleipner A GBS. 
 
3.2. Norwegian Contractors’ fitness landscape  
3.2.1. Emerging landscape of opportunities 
The discovery, in 1959, of a large natural gas field near Slochteren in 
the Netherlands, followed in subsequent years by investigations of the 
geological layers harboring this reservoir - layers that extended into 
the floor of the North Sea - established the North Sea as a field of 
opportunities and possibilities for oil companies and supplier 
                                                 
9 Barabási, a physicist exploring the properties and structure of real-world 
evolving networks, argues that networks with a ‘scale-free topology’, like for 
example the internet, have a high tolerance (robustness) for random, local 
failures in combination with a high vulnerability to coordinated attacks on the 
network’s most connected hubs (Barabási 2002). 
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industries alike.  However, a decade of exploration drilling and dry 
wells elapsed before the discovery of the Ekofisk field in 1969 by US 
based Phillips Petroleum Company.  
In the early 1970s a number of (f)actors shaped the fitness 
landscape on which three Norwegian entrepreneurial firms started 
their adaptive search.  
The Norwegian government – having resisted Phillips 
Petroleum’s ‘bluff’ request for a concession for the whole Norwegian 
continental shelf – made the granting of concessions conditional on 
the involvement of Norwegian firms and suppliers, so that the capital 
investments necessary for offshore field development would benefit 
Norwegian national and regional economies and create jobs (Ryggvik 
1997).  
The foreign oil companies dominating early production in the 
North Sea – following the discovery of the Ekofisk field in 1969 - did 
not bring ready-made field development solutions to the area. They 
had two decades offshore experience in the shallow water of the 
Mexican Gulf. The North Sea, although still a shallow sea allowing 
fixed platforms, was deeper and the climate was much harsher. 
Conventional technologies did not suffice to guarantee sustained safe 
and regular production; i.e. on-site storage facilities were necessary 
for sustained production when bad weather prohibited tankers to load 
oil. New technological solutions had to be developed. The harsh 
climate made construction work and heavy lifting operations on 
offshore-sites difficult and expensive. The Norwegian fjords provided 
unique sheltered, but deep-water construction sites, with on-land 
storage facilities and mechanical workshops only a stone cast away 
(Olsen & Engen 1997).  
The unilateral action of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) in 1973 to increase the ‘tax reference price’ with 
70% and to reduce production rates produced a fourfold increase of an 
already rising marked price for oil and accelerated the rate of field 
development in the North Sea area (Hanisch & Nerheim 1992:422 ff.). 
Speed of delivery was a crucial factor.  Phillips Petroleum wanted to 
build a large oil storage facility on the Ekofisk field.  
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3.2.2. Adjacent opportunities 
Three Norwegian entrepreneurial firms, A/F Høyer Ellefsen, F. 
Selmer and Thor Furuholmen, recognized in this specific 
configurations of (f)actors an adjacent opportunity10 to claim for 
themselves a place in this emerging and expanding field of the North 
Sea offshore industry. They joint forces in a working partnership and 
asserted under the name of Norwegian Contractor’s their ability to 
deliver a storage facility for Phillip’s Ekofisk-field in concrete faster 
than any alternative solution. This tipped the scale in favor of a 
solution in concrete. The contract was awarded to a French firm, C.G. 
Dorris, with Norwegian Contractors as subcontractors for the actual 
construction and delivery of the Ekofisk-tank (Olsen & Engen: 1997: 
116). Building the tank as a floating structure in the fjord near 
Stavanger, the partnership of three Norwegian entrepreneurs delivered 
the tank on site on July 1, 1973 (Hanisch & Nerheim 1992: 201 ff.). 
For Norway and for a range of Norwegian companies the 
adventure of offshore oil and gas production in the North Sea had 
started for real. Expectations were high. It would be a quickly 
expanding though dynamic market with high profit margins. The 
partnership that constituted Norwegian Contractors started on an 
adaptive search for an optimal position and performance in the 
emerging market. On the Ekofisk-tank NC had been a subcontractor 
for the French company C.G. Doris who had designed and engineered 
the tank. On the basis of their ‘own’ (patented) Condeep-concept NC 
now entered into the bidding process for production platforms for new 
fields both on the Norwegian and British continental shelf (Brent, 
Beryl, Statfjord). And they were successful. In the fall of 1974 and 
winter 1975 Norwegian Contractors had six platforms in concrete 
under construction at two different construction sites in Åndalsnes and 
in Stavanger (Beryl A, Brent B, Statfjord A, Brent D, CDP-1 for the 
                                                 
10 Like in a play of chess, an adjacent opportunity is a ‘possible move’,  made 
possible by the emergence of a specific configuration of pieces on the board. 
While excluding a range of moves that are not or no longer possible, the 
emergent configuration does not determine the ones that are possible. 
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Frigg field, and TCP-2)11 (Steen 1993: 21 ff.) With regard to fixed 
production platform solutions the fitness landscape now had at least 
two fitness hills, one for solutions in steel and one for solutions in 
concrete. The group of licensees (oil companies) looking for optimal 
field development solutions would have to make an early decision for 
steel or for concrete; a choice to which they would be increasingly 
committed as the work progressed (lock-in). 
 
3.2.3. Uphill search strategy: developing turn key capability 
The livelihood of a company depends on the regularity with which it 
can generate revenues.  Being dependent on a few, although very large 
projects made Norwegian Contractors vulnerable.  NC sought to 
improve its economic fitness along two different lines. The first 
strategy was through diversification, or in landscape terms, the 
exploration of distant fitness hills. At the end of the 1970s and in the 
early 1980s NC looked for other applications of concrete in the 
offshore industry. This was the decade of the construction of the large 
pipes for the transportation of oil and gas directly from the fields to 
on-shore installations. These steel pipes were coated with a layer of 
concrete. Forming a partnership with Bredero Price International  
(Bredero Norwegian Constractors = BNC) NC won a contract for the 
coating of the Statpipe. NC also engaged itself in two other 
companies, Inocean and Deepocean, devoted to subsea construction 
and subsea engineering (Steen 1993: 54 ff.). 
The second strategy amounted to climbing the Condeep-fitness 
hill further. NC’s 1970s contracts on concrete platforms were partial 
contracts. The oil companies that acted as operators for a field – on 
behalf of the group of licensees – held the discretionary power to 
award contracts for various parts of the production process to different 
companies. NC’s core competence, that it set out with in the early 
                                                 
11 In this same period contracts for six other platforms in concrete were awarded 
to (partnerships of) companies outside of Norway, in Great Britain, the 
Netherlands and France. After this first wave of concrete platforms in the 1970s 
several years elapsed before another one was commissioned. Market conditions 
had changed by then and in the early 1980s Norwegian Contractors was alone 
(Steen 1993: 34). 
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1970s on its adaptive search, was in building in concrete, not in 
designing and engineering of concrete constructions, not in 
mechanical engineering, not in maritime operations.12  
Through their 1970s projects Norwegian Constractors developed 
expertise in all these areas. Over the years NC developed a high in-
house competence for marine operations: deck mating and the towing 
to and installation of Condeep-platforms on their offshore-site. The 
TCP-2 platform was the first platform in which NC was responsible 
for the (marine) deck mating operation.  
Mechanical engineering on a concrete gravity base structures 
falls into two parts: 1) the tubing, pumps and (computer) equipment 
that are necessary for the ballasting and balancing operations through 
the various phases of the platform’s construction (Contractors 
Mechanical Outfitting = CMO), and 2) the tubing and equipment 
required in the process of oil and gas productions, called Main 
Mechanical Outfitting (MMO), connecting the topside installations 
with the wells on the seafloor. Statfjord B was the first platform for 
which NC got the contract for the CMO. Later, during the 1980s NC 
also landed contracts for the MMO for Troll and Draugen (Steen 
1993: 58 ff.). In 1988 Norwegian Contractors established a separate 
mechanical engineering division that also competed for not-offshore 
related, land based mechanical engineering contracts. In terms of 
fitness landscapes this latter move represents a process of exploration 
of distant fitness hills again. 
Over the years Norwegian Contractors pursued an uphill search 
strategy aimed at developing ‘turn key capability’, that is the ability to 
                                                 
12 In the specific context of the production of platforms I will use the word 
design to refer to work entailed in modelling the platform and solving the 
mathematical equations representing forces, stresses and tensions in the concrete 
structure under various phases of its fabrication, use and possible impacts from 
ships, storms and earthquakes. In the same context I will use the word 
engineering to the work entailed in the translation of the design output into 
dimensions and placement of reinforcement steel, drawings and lists of materials 
to be used on the construction site. The word construction will refer to the actual 
building process. Marine operations refers to the towing out of a platform to its 
offshore site and installation to its placement on the seafloor, hooking it up to oil 
or gas wells and pipelines, preparing the platform for production. 
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offer complete solutions under one contract to the commissioning oil 
companies. We can subsume NC’s investments in the development of 
in-house expertise in global or finite element analysis under the same 
sustained uphill search strategy.  
For Condeep-projects in the 1970s en 1980s, the global or finite 
element analysis and the engineering were contracted out. Computas, 
a DNV company, did the global analysis (GA) until 1984. Thereafter 
Veritec did the GA – the technical and consultancy branch of Det 
Norske Veritas (Andersen & Collett 1989: 385) in Høvik near Oslo. 
The engineering was done by Dr tech Olav Olsen, an engineering firm 
located very close to NC’s Stabekk offices in Oslo. While contracting 
out the global analysis for the platforms-to-be-build to 
Computas/Veritec, over the years NC performed 10 large GA-studies 
in house. Furthermore, NC developed specific software that would 
allow them to automate the input of data representing the many 
different load situations (NC 1995: 10). 
 
3.2.4. Changing landscape 
NC performed well in this fitness landscape. In the 1980s they 
achieved a monopoly position for concrete offshore constructions in 
the North Sea. In the second half of the 1980s the landscape changed 
however.  
During the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s NC continued to 
operate as a partnership owned by three different firms. In relation to 
their owners NC developed a high degree of independence. In 1986 
NC was transformed into a company in its own right, listed on the 
Oslo stock exchange. Aker – with Kværner one of the two major 
Norwegian players in offshore engineering – first bought Høyer 
Ellefsen’s and, in 1987, Selmer’s shares in NC (Steen 1993: 37). This 
turned independent NC into an Aker company. This also shifted the 
financial risks for these huge projects from the original owner firms – 
who never would have been able to survive the financial consequences 
of the loss of a Condeep-platform – to Aker. At top-level managers 
from Aker companies, shaped by Bergen’s business school tradition, 
replaced an audacious and entrepreneurial styled leadership dominated 
by engineers.  
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In December 1985 and early 1986 oil prices in the international 
market dropped sharply – from an average of 27,5 to 14,8 US dollars a 
barrel (Austvik 1989: 19) -, reducing overall profit margins and 
creating serious cash flow problems for oil companies. Experiences 
from the 1970s learned that the North Sea was much more expensive 
to build in than originally expected. The overall level of field 
development costs had been under discussion for several years, but the 
1986 drop of oil prices made the matter much more urgent. This 
resulted in an industry wide initiative to reduce field development 
costs through standardization: the NORSOK-project (NORSOK 
1995). This renewed cost awareness permeated the whole field.  
Simultaneously, NC’s competition grew stronger. In 1988 
Peconor – a consortium of Norwegian and foreign construction firms 
established in 1983 – broke NC’s 1980s concrete monopoly by 
winning Phillips Petroleum’s contract for a protective concrete wall 
around the Ekofisk-tank (BT Olje 1988: 4-5). Peconor announced that 
they would compete with NC for the upcoming contracts on Troll, 
Draugen and Heidrun. 13 
 
3.3. Adaptive performance systems 
In this overview of NC’s history I have been describing Norwegian 
Contractors as a single adaptive unity. Drawing on evolutionary 
biologists like Wright and Jacob, Kauffman (1993: 33) conceives of 
adaptation as a local search process in a space of possibilities, the 
fitness landscape. But not every change – incremental or radical – 
does improve the system’s fitness, that is, its ability to perform its 
task. The metaphorical image is ‘one of local hill climbing via fitter 
mutants toward some local or global optimum’ (Kauffman 1993: 33). 
Considering the centrality of task performance in this study I prefer 
Holland’s (1995) term performance system over the more general term 
                                                 
13 Peconor = Petroleum Construction Norway. Peconor lost the battle for Troll, 
Draugen and Heidrun, all of these contracts going to Norwegian Contractors. 
Another consortium, SeaCoNor (=Sea Construction Norway), established in 
1983, consisting of A/S Jernbetong, C.G. Doris and Skanska, tried to compete 
with NC,  but failed. Peconor was dismantled and SeaCoNor withdrew from the 
offshore market. 
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of complex adaptive system. I will write about adaptive performance 
systems. 
 
3.3.1. Performative closure 
At this level of aggregation and description the performance criteria 
that would define NC’s fitness would be in economic terms: its ability 
to sustain a regular cash flow and profitability. In the North Sea area 
NC had a first mover advantage, but each new contract had to be won 
under serious competition. Their ability to win new contracts was – at 
least to some extend – based on NC’s demonstrated ability to ‘deliver 
on time and on site’. I will call this their ability to achieve 
performative closure, both with regard to the company’s economic 
performance and with regard to project completion.  
Writing about the origin of life Kauffman (1993: 301 ff.) speaks 
of catalytic closure in self-organizing sets or networks of catalytic 
chemical reactions (autocatalytic sets). It is the whole set of reactions 
that constitutes an adaptive performance system. Survival in its 
environment does not depend on (selection against) individual 
mutations in one of the reaction chemicals but on the adequacy of task 
performance of the system as a whole (see also section 3.5. and Solé 
and Goodwin (2000: 227)). In constructivist science and technology 
studies the notion of closure is used to refer the reduction of 
interpretative flexibility characterizing the end of a scientific 
controversy, or the selection of one technical design over the 
alternatives (Bijker et al. 1987: Bijker 1994). In his works on 
discourse coalitions Hajer (1995: 22) writes about discursive closure, 
referring to the process through which a set of diverse claims and 
discursive fragments, nearly all of them being contested, ‘somehow’ 
become related to one another and result in a particular definition of 
the policy problem.  Although used in very different disciplines the 
notion of closure generally refers to the emergence of some kind of 
order (socio-cognitive, technical, biological) in interactive 
(cooperative and competitive) and interdependent processes operating 
in a selective environment. 
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3.3.2. Highly connected clusters 
Moving down one level of description we can see that Norwegian 
Contractors was not a single, homogeneous unity, but that is was a 
heterogeneous aggregate of multiple adaptive performance systems. 
Stripping the company from all its specifics and adopting Barabási’s 
network vocabulary we could say that NC had a modular organization, 
in the sense that groups put together to solve or perform specific tasks 
form highly connected clusters or modules. Each module is connected 
to other modules with only a few links.  Modular organization allows 
complex adaptive systems to handle multitasking (Barabási 2002: 
231-2). In many organizations this takes the shape of 
departmentalization. NC had a matrix organization: specialized 
groups, i.e. for design, engineering, marine operations, constituted the 
permanent and basic structure of the company. For each project, these 
groups handled the work involved in the protracted pre-contract 
period. Towards the actual signing of the contract and depending on 
its terms, (temporary) project teams or organizations were put together 
for the execution of the contract, drawing on resources from its own 
base organization and hiring consultants and subcontractors for 
specific tasks. Consultants and subcontractors were recruited from a 
network of engineers and engineering companies that was also highly 
connected: many people knowing each other personally, having 
worked together on previous Condeep or other projects. A design 
team like the one that was assembled to design Sleipner A, conceived 
as an adaptive performance system, straddled formal company 
boundaries. 
  In the case of Norwegian Contractors it is also important to 
distinguish between two sites: the offices at Stabekk, near Oslo’s 
former airport Fornebu, where the design, engineering and accounting 
were performed, and the construction sites at Hinna in Stavanger and 
in Åndalsnes, both located on Norway’s west coast.  
 
3.4. Culture 
Specifics do matter. In addition to a characterization of NC’s 
organizational structure in terms of modules or matrixes, the aggregate 
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of adaptive performance systems can be characterized in social and 
cultural terms.  
 Following work in social theory on space, work that is focusing 
on how people through the way in which they conceive and perceive 
the world, and through their practices, produce ‘social spaces’, we 
could speak in Shields (1997) words about social spatialization. 
Societies, but also companies like Norwegian Contractors are socially 
spatialized. The notion of social space and social spatialization 
accounts for important cultural, cognitive and practical dimensions of 
the way in which people attribute cultural and social significance to 
the world. Social spaces are not a given, they are produced and 
reproduced; that is, they are emergent, they are contested and they 
interfere with each other. This interference between social spaces can 
be negative or positive. Shields (1997) speaks of stress and resistance 
to refer to the negative frictions in the encounter between different 
social spaces. I will speak of resonance to refer to positive, enhancing 
interactions. 
 In work on organizational cultures there is a similar move 
towards more differentiated and fragmented perspectives on culture in 
organizations (Frost et al. 1991). In her history on oil worker cultures 
in the North Sea offshore industry, Smith-Solbakken (1997: 6), moves 
from a general notion of organizational culture to a, for her purposes, 
more appropriate notion of workplace culture. The offshore 
workplaces that she studied occupied workers from many different 
organizations, from oil companies but also from subcontractors, but 
also from different nationalities. These workplaces were places were 
people from different, similar or opposite, cultural backgrounds 
encountered each other, adapted and transformed (Smith-Solbakken 
1997: 11). Culture is both something that people bring with them, a 
resource, and an emergent outcome of local interactions that then 
again can act as a resource. 
 In empirical, sociological and anthropological studies of 
scientific practice there is a strong emphasis on the situatedness of 
knowledge and skills. For Pickering (1992: 3), culture ‘denotes the 
field of resources that scientists draw upon in their work’. Practice 
‘refers to the acts of making … that they perform in that field’. The 
products or outcomes of practices, Pickering argues, ‘might well 
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function as a resource for future practice’ (Pickering 1992: 3). The 
field of resources that Pickering refers to as culture is heterogeneous, 
that is, it comprises also, or perhaps primarily, material resources: ‘the 
hammer, nails and planks of wood’ to construct a dog kennel.  
 Hence, adaptive performance systems can be localized in space 
and time. The performance of the assigned tasks takes place in 
specific workplaces, the boundaries of which are not defined by the 
walls of an office or building, but are constituted by the highly 
connected cluster or network that performs the task. Adaptive 
performance systems can be characterized by the skills and knowledge 
that they draw upon to perform their task and by the tools that they 
use. In and through the performance of their tasks adaptive 
performance systems gain experience, develop new tools, new 
knowledge and from their interactions emerge criteria to evaluate the 
work performed. In these specifics adaptive performance systems can 
be quite different. The design team of Sleipner A used advanced 
software packages and mainframe computers to calculate the forces 
and stresses in cylinders, domes and shafts of concrete under a variety 
of load conditions. On NC’s construction site at Hinna workers use 
their skills and knowledge to assemble the dense web of reinforcement 
steel and mix and pour high quality concrete in a continuous process 
of slip forming. This again is quite different from the accounting 
department monitoring the economic performance of the project. The 
understanding of Sleipner A that these different adaptive performance 
systems achieve is radically different, yet they all must achieve 
performative closure for the specific task that has been assigned to 
them. 
 The project, Sleipner A in this case, is not produced by a single 
adaptive performance system: it moves through several of them. It is 
transferred from one to another. This transfer can be fixed in terms of 
specific deliverables that travel from one to the other: a report 
outlining the basic design of the platform, data batches representing 
the output of the global analysis (design) and being send to 
engineering, drawings and material lists traveling to the construction 
site, the physical structure in concrete and reinforcement steel ready 
for deck-mating. 
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 In its temporal dimension this movement through multiple 
adaptive performance systems is directed. Between adaptive 
performance systems the process is not recursive; there is no going 
back. As it goes from one workplace, to use Smith-Solbakken’s word, 
to the other it gains in irreversibility (lock-in). The costs of going back 
and redo earlier work is to high and would take to much time; and 
time is, given the predetermined start of production, also a cost. On an 
energy landscape going back would amount to going up the energy 
gradient again, whereas the movement is downhill to a cost-effective 
valley floor. On a fitness landscape going back and redo work from 
earlier stages would amount to stepping down to the valley again and 
start looking for a new and better way uphill, perhaps on another 
fitness hill. We will only see recursive movements within adaptive 
performance systems; not descents to the valley floor, but one or to 
steps down the slope.  Of course, the loss of the Sleipner A gravity 
base structure forced NC and Statoil to go back to previous stages of 
work. 
 
3.5. Selection 
The approach developed here embodies an evolutionary perspective. 
Hence, selection culls the less fit from the fitter variants. Kauffman 
(1993; 1995) does not tire to say, that selection does not act on 
individual mutations but on complex wholes. Within these complex 
wholes individual variations may be neutral in terms of their effect on 
overall fitness. And, if several solutions to specific design problems 
are equally good in terms of overall fitness, why not choose the one 
that is most convenient, requires less materials or time, or is less 
expensive. In other words, why not choose (select) the solutions that 
allow the system, either in terms of work in the process or in terms of 
costs of the final product, to occupy a lower energy position on the 
energy landscape. Hence, in terms of fitness, there are environments 
or regions that are selectively neutral: there is a selectively neutral 
fitness shell  (Kauffman 1993: 108).  Hence, features that are selected 
because they are equally fit to alternatives and are either equal or 
lower in terms of energy will be retained. They will be incorporated in 
the (intermediary) products that represent the achievement of 
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performative closure (the whole) and follow along with it to the next 
stage of work.  
Selection is not some mystical force. Selection in the case of 
Condeep-design is very concrete. In he following chapters I will 
distinguish three selection levels: a) the credit assignment and reward 
mechanisms within the design team, b) the design and engineering 
revisions and verifications that are part of the formal quality 
assessment procedures involving company internal but also external 
experts and consultancy firms, and c) the physical environment of the 
water in Gandsfjorden. 
 
3.6. Comparative note on complexity, interactivity and 
adaptivity 
Before we proceed, a comparative note on the use of terms 
complexity, interactivity and adaptivity is in order here.  
The way in which the terms complexity and interactivity are 
used here is quite different from the way in which Perrow combines 
them in his notion of complex interactions (vs linear interactions). For 
Perrow (1984/1999: 78), ‘complex interactions are those of unfamiliar 
sequences, or unplanned and unexpected sequences, and either not 
visible or not immediately comprehensible’. In Perrow’s work 
complex (and linear) interactions constitute, together with tight (and 
loose) coupling, a conceptual framework for thinking about accident 
causation. They are (static) properties that make industrial systems 
more prone to systemic failure (normal accidents). Complexity 
theorists look at the density and pattern of interactions as a source of 
emerging order. The ways in which the emergence of order, of 
optimal performance, relates to systemic failures is subtler. This is not 
to deny that this narrative of the Sleipner A GBS loss could be recast 
in a ‘normal accidents’ framework. In fact, this study contains a 
telling example of a Perrowian complex interaction. 
 Rasmussen (1994: 22-3) presented a model of adaptive work 
performance that comes very close to the framework presented here. 
With the characteristic emphasis of a psychologist and human factor 
analyst on human behavior at the ‘sharp end’ of the human/system 
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interface, Rasmussen argued that human behavior in any system is 
shaped by objectives and constraints that must be respected by the 
actors for the work performance to be successful. Such objectives and 
constraints define the boundary conditions of a workspace, a design 
envelope, within which the human actors can navigate freely. 
According to Rasmussen, the choice among several possible work 
strategies for navigation within the envelope specified by these 
boundaries depends on subjective criteria, related to process features 
such as time spent, work load, pleasure, excitement of exploring new 
territory. Work practices will be characterized by local, situation-
induced variations within the workspace. Rasmussen argued, that the 
result will very likely be a systematic migration toward the boundary 
of acceptable performance and, when crossing an irreversible 
boundary, a local work accident may occur. Emphasizing the local 
interactive and self-organizing processes underlying this drift-like 
migration, he draws an analogy with the ‘physics of interactions’ that 
produce the Brownian movements of molecules of a gas. The 
metaphor of Brownian movements might suggest an image of erratic 
and undirected drift within a space of possible work strategies. 
According to Rasmussen there is some direction, though. Although he 
does not elaborate on it, Rasmussen introduces the notion of a 
gradient to indicate some directionality in local adaptations. 
 
Such variability will give ample opportunity for the actors themselves 
to identify ‘an effort gradient’ and management tends to always make 
a ‘cost gradient’ very visible to the staff (Rasmussen 1994: 23). 
 
Rasmussen does not use the metaphor of a fitness hill, but it is not 
difficult to conceive of his workspace as Kauffman’s selectively 
neutral fitness shell hovering around the top of such a hill, a region in 
which adaptive changes will be considered neutral, or valued 
positively (because of their lower energy state), without them 
affecting the overall task performance of the system. It is important, 
however, to recognize that the location of the boundaries of the 
envelope can only be reconstructed with hindsight, in a secondary 
process of accident investigation. 
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Chapter 4 
Sleipner A: adaptive changes before contract 
 
We are now prepared to examine in detail the design and engineering 
process of Sleipner A. An analysis along the conceptual lines set forth 
in the preceding chapter can be pursued at various levels of 
description and aggregation, requiring different research methods 
though; it may even move between levels.  The following chapters 
will focus on NC’s design team, led by NC personnel but also 
comprising personnel from other engineering firms. From the previous 
chapters we should recall that the circumstances in which the design 
team was assembled and had to work were the result of an adaptive 
search process performed by Norwegian Contractors as a company. 
Starting out in the 1970s as a partnership of entrepreneurial firms with 
core competencies in project management and concrete constructions, 
NC consciously invested in the development of in-house competencies 
in global analysis and design, in mechanical engineering, in marine 
operation – in order to be able to offer turn-key solutions. A dramatic 
1986-drop in oil prices and profit margins, inducing an industry wide 
awareness of overall field development costs14 (Austvik 1989: 19), 
constituted an important change in NC’s environment (and fitness 
landscape). So did the emergence of serious competition, with 
Peconor winning the contract for the Ekofisk wall in 1988, breaking 
NC’s concrete monopoly for the first time. Peconor announced that 
they would compete with NC for the upcoming contracts on Troll, 
Draugen and Heidrun (BT Olje 1988: 4-5). 
 
4.1. Instable fitness landscape 
Condeeps – as any offshore field development solution – had long 
lead times. The licenses for the Sleipner-field were allocated in 1976. 
                                                 
14 This resulted in an industry wide initiative to reduce field development costs 
through standardization: the NORSOK-project (NORSOK 1995). 
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Owning 49,6 % of the license for the Sleipner field15, Statoil was 
assigned as operator on the license, being responsible for negotiations 
with customers for the gas to be produced, for the fabrication and 
installation of production installations and for operations on the field. 
Development of the field was delayed due to the rejection by the 
British government of a contract negotiated by the British Gas 
Corporation (Selvaag 1988). The contract was about to be signed; for 
this specific task performative closure had been almost achieved. The 
British government’s rejection of the contract threw Statoil back into 
the valley and forced them to look for a new fitness hill.  Sales 
contracts had to be renegotiated, having consequences for the general 
technical infrastructure of the field. Instead of landing the gas on the 
British shore it now had to be transported to Belgium and Germany. 
This second time around, performative closure was achieved. 
Conclusion of these major sales contracts set a time- and deadline for 
the commencement of production and delivery of pre-arranged 
quantities of gas.  
Simultaneously the operator had to evaluate various technical 
field development solutions for feasibility and profitability 
(Gudmestad et al. 1993: 9 ff.).  Fixed or floating? Steel or concrete? A 
formal plan for development and operation of the field had to be 
submitted to the Norwegian authorities for approval by parliament. 
Sleipner A was going to be the first production platform on the field: a 
fixed solution in concrete. These early decisions started Statoil on a 
uphill trajectory that would become increasingly irreversible.  This 
trajectory was not predetermined, however. It would have to be 
explored in an adaptive search process. Neither was it clear where the 
top of the hill would be. 
The shape of fitness landscapes, for any adaptive performance 
system, is influenced by the activity of other actors. In the mid-1980s 
the landscape became very unstable. 
                                                 
15 This is including 29.6% for SDØE, the Norwegian state’s direct financial 
interest (SDFI). The remainder of the license was owned by: ESSO Norge a.s. 
30.4%, Norsk Hydro Produksjon A/S 10.0%, Elf Aquitaine Norge A/S 9.0%, 
Total Norge A/S 1.0%. 
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As Norway established itself as a major supplier of gas and oil, 
the state wanted, in Gro Harlem Brundtland’s (1989: 19) words,  
to secure maximum economic and social benefits from our energy 
resources. This requires that specific goals relating to the energy 
sector be attuned to overall economic needs of the country, to regional 
policies and to local as well as global environmental needs. … in a 
long term perspective. 
To secure a larger income from offshore activities the Norwegian state 
had, in 1984, taken a direct financial interest in oil and gas production 
in the North Sea. Through this direct financial interest the state 
directly owned part of the license on a field, contributing in the 
investments but also taking their share in the profits generated – in 
addition to taxing the profits of other oil companies owning shares of 
the license. 29.9 % of Statoil’s 49.9 % share in the Sleipner license 
were transferred to the states direct financial interest; effectively 
transferring a substantial part of the revenues from the Sleipner field 
out of the company.  The oil prices had peaked in the first half of the 
decade but dropped sharply in December 1985 and early 1986, further 
deteriorating future cash flow prospects for the exploitation of the 
Sleipner-field. The drop in oil prices induced a high awareness of the 
necessity to contain overall field development costs. This resulted in 
an industry wide cooperative initiative to reduce field development 
costs through standardization: the NORSOK-project (NORSOK 
1995). 
Norwegian Contractors had successfully risen to the challenge of 
(and achieving performative closure in) building the gravity base 
structures for Gullfaks A, B and – hitherto the largest ever – Gullfaks 
C: production platforms for the first Norwegian oil field developed 
and operated by Norwegian companies only (Nordås 2000). However, 
a fatal accident in 1985 revealed that NC was not invincible either. On 
November 4, 1985, CONCEM, a barge moored in Gandsfjorden to the 
side of Gullfaks B for the mixing of concrete, capsized and was lost, 
killing 10 out of 22 people on board (Laake et al. 1985). 
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4.2. The Concept Report 
Having concluded sales contracts for gas from the Sleipner-field with 
large customers, the next step in the process for the operator, Statoil, 
was to develop a basis for the contracts with engineering firms for the 
fabrication of the platform.  
As a basis for the contract between Statoil and NC for the 
fabrication of Sleipner A, in 1987-’88 they developed – through 
collaborative work - a Concept Report. Gudmestad et al (1993:15) 
conceived of this process – that could take up to a year – as an 
iterative, but basically linear process. The Concept Report translated 
physical characteristics of the site (water depth, seafloor conditions), 
estimated weight of topside installations, required storage facilities, 
etc. into a basic design for the platform: number, diameter and height 
of the cells in the base; number, distance, heights and functions of the 
shafts. Taking into account applicable regulations issued by the 
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate and cost estimates, the Concept 
Report set the boundaries for a feasible, reliable and cost-effective 
platform. In terms of the fitness landscape metaphor, the Concept 
Report staked out the perimeter of a region around the top of a hill, 
representing a performance optimum. From here on it is, as Steinar 
Leivestad at the Norwegian Construction Standardisation Board puts 
it, ‘a matter of designing according to assumptions’. Stay within the 
boundaries (of the envelop). 
 
4.3. The Statfjord A problem and a hole in the tricell top 
dome 
In its details the Sleipner A Concept Report was not based only on 
field data and functional requirements. Solutions to problems 
experienced in previous Condeep-platforms carried over into the 
design of Sleipner A. According to Per Irgens, NC’s SLA project 
manager, NC ran into serious problems in every Condeep platform 
built, but they had always been able to solve these problems. While 
building the Statfjord A platform in Gandsfjorden in the 1970s, NC 
encountered a serious problem with crack formation and propagation 
in the tricell corners. The hydrostatic pressure of the water column in 
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the tricell pressed the Y-shaped tricell corner apart where there was no 
ballast water in the cell to counteract this pressure. The problem 
emphasized the tricell corners as particularly vulnerable and critical 
areas in Condeep design. In subsequent projects the ‘Statfjord A 
problem’ was solved through changes in the geometry of the tricells 
and the placement of bicycle handlebar shaped reinforcement bars 
across the corner, stopping the propagation of any cracks that might 
appear.  
In all projects prior to Sleipner A water pressure in the tricells 
was an issue. Constructing the Gullfaks platforms for deeper water the 
tricells were designed with a closed top dome, fitted with a piping 
system for letting in or pumping water out of the tricells as part of the 
ballasting and balancing operations. As a result, during construction 
and installation NC had control over the water pressure in the tricells 
and could reduce the pressure if required. This closed dome 
arrangement served as a protection mechanism for the tricell corners 
and it would, in case of crack formation, prevent the pressure of the 
full water column in the crack and thus reduce its propagation. 
Sleipner A was designed with an open hole – with a diameter of 
50 cm – in the top dome of the tricells. The mechanical installation 
required for the in- and outlet of water was deemed not to be 
necessary in this case. The Statfjord A problem had been solved 
through changes in the geometry and reinforcements and proved to 
work well in the Gullfaks series. The maximum hydrostatic pressure 
on various levels of the tricell corners during the various phases of 
construction, deck mating and installation could be calculated exactly 
and incorporated in the Concept Report as boundary load conditions.  
Of course, given the number of tricells in a Condeep (32 in 
Sleipner A) this change in the design resulted in a reduction of costs. I 
have not been able to establish the primary motives for the open hole 
in the top domes of the tricells.16 However, there is no reason to 
                                                 
16 The engineers I interviewed were involved in the post-contract design and 
engineering work. As soon as I became aware of the difference between 
Sleipner A and previous Condeeps, I raised the issue of the hole with them all. 
Several of them had no recollection of the hole at all, and none could provide the 
primary reason for the hole. Some provided suggestions of the secondary uses to 
which the hole could be put. Tormod Dyken entertained a train of thought 
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suspect that it was motivated by ‘cost reduction at the expense of 
technical reliability’, that is to adopt design features that were judged 
to be unsound by the engineers involved. When, from an engineering 
perspective, a top dome with a hole and a top dome with pipes and 
valves were considered to be equal, this feature was in a selectively 
neutral fitness shell. When equal in technical fitness the variant that 
would produce a lower energy/cost level constituted the preferable 
alternative, also for the engineers. Why have a mechanical installation 
of pipes, pumps and valves if you do not need it? The increased cost 
awareness in both Statoil and the new management of – the now Aker 
owned - Norwegian Contractors constituted a selection environment 
that would positively value cost reducing design changes that were 
judged to be technically sound by Statoil’s Sleipner A project group 
and NC’s engineers involved in the interactive process of elaborating 
the Concept Report. In other words, the design change resonated or 
correlated, as Marion (18, 74) calls it, with the field development cost 
awareness that permeated the industry. Resonance or correlation is the 
interactive mechanism through which the behaviors of different actors 
achieve a measure of sync-ness. The tricell top dome with open hole 
was selected and it was retained in the directed movement of the 
project through the next stages where different adaptive performance 
systems execute their specific tasks.17 
                                                                                                                                                        
assuming that you would have a hole when you wanted full water pressure on 
the inner walls of the tricells to reverse the pressure difference across the wall, 
to prevent hydrocarbons seeping out into the water in the tricell that would 
eventually end up in the sea. Perhaps in relation with new environmental 
regulations. However, I have not been able to confirm such a change of 
regulations. As motives do not explain the overall behaviour of systems, the 
consequences of the hole are more important than its reasons. 
17 How should we call a design feature like this? In hindsight we can see that the 
hole, in interaction with the crack and the leak, was one of the elements 
constituting a Perrowian complex interaction resulting in the actual loss of the 
platform. Should we call it a mistake, an error, a lapse of judgement? Or 
perhaps, in Reason’s (1993) words, a latent failure. The problem is that most of 
the time, latent failures can only be recognized after the accident and through 
secondary accident investigation processes. In the primary process there is no 
error. 
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The open hole was small at first. Later in the process it was 
enlarged to a diameter of 50 cm. The enlargement would not make a 
difference in terms of water pressures, but it would allow secondary 
uses of the hole, i.e. the insertion, if necessary at some point in the 
lifetime of the platform, of submersible pumps.  
 
4.4. Quality Assurance according to standard 
In previous Condeep projects Statoil’s respective project groups spent 
a substantial amount of time on design reviews. Induced by the 
renewed, industry wide cost awareness Statoil wanted to cut back on 
the number of hours spent on quality assurance work by its own 
personnel. In the Sleipner A project Statoil put emphasis on the 
contractor’s own responsibility for setting up and complying to in-
house quality assurance procedures.  
Statoil-SLA was quite explicit about the QA requirements that 
were to be incorporated into the contract. Parallel to the elaboration of 
the Concept Report NC developed a Quality Assurance Manual in 
accordance with national (NS 5801) standards, ‘adjusted to meet 
Statoil’s needs related to critical contracts’ (Jersin & Søreide 1997: 
16). The manual was not a description of the working practices that 
NC had evolved over the years in which it had successfully built 
eleven Condeep platforms. It was developed on the basis of formal 
standards, and in accordance with ‘practice in the trade’, but the 
standard was not ‘particularly well suited for engineering tasks of this 
type’ (Jersin & Søreide 1997: 14).  
There was a substantial gap between an entrepreneurial practice 
that had proven itself to be successful and Statoil’s emphasis on 
compliance with the formal protocol of national and international 
standards. The encounter between two different cultures, associated 
with two different workplaces and adaptive performance systems that 
were irreversibly bound to cooperate, created serious friction and 
stress. Statoil representatives pushed NC’s engineers in this matter to 
the brink of a conflict that, according to Per Irgens, had to be resolved 
at top managerial level. 
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In compliance with NPD regulations saying that an independent, 
third party engineering consultant should be involved in the quality 
assurance procedures, Statoil negotiated a contract with DNV-
company Veritec. The terms of the contract were limited though, in 
the sense that Veritec was not to do a complete verification of all 
documentation produced by NC in the course the design work, but that 
Statoil-SLA would select documentation to be reviewed by Veritec 
from the ‘deliverables’ that Statoil received from NC. For each of 
these selections Statoil would issue a specific work order. 
Statoil audited NC’s QA procedures, had them make some more 
changes having to do with differences in the interpretation of formal 
regulations and rules, and found them, in the end, to be satisfactory. 
Between the two an EPC-contract was signed on June 30, 1988, 
comprising the engineering (E), procurement of materials (P) and 
construction (C) of Sleipner A, including marine operations18 (Statoil 
1991: 12). 
                                                 
18 The contract for the main mechanical outfitting in the GBS went to Rosenborg 
Verft. Aker Engineering designed and built the topside structure (steel decks and 
gas processing installations). 
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Chapter 5 
Sleipner A:  Global Analysis (GA) 
 
Global analysis is the procedure for calculating the forces and stresses 
that occur in the concrete cylinders, domes and shafts of the platform 
under a large number of different load situations that can occur during 
the various phases of fabrication, transportation, installation and use 
of the platform. With regard to load situations, think of high waves 
and undercurrents in the sea and raging storms above water level, but 
also of falling objects (tools) or ships colliding with the platform. The 
platform must be able to resist all these different load situations and 
even be able to sustain considerable damage without loosing its 
technical integrity. The mathematical equations describing the 
continuous forces and stresses in curved shapes of concrete are 
difficult to solve. For practical design purposes an approximation 
technique has been introduced that represents curved and continuous 
shapes as being composed of discrete and finite elements (rectangles, 
triangles, etc.): finite element analysis. Forces are calculated in the 
corners of these finite elements, followed by interpolation between 
them. For a large structure like a Condeep-platform even this 
technique requires a considerable amount of computer time and thus, 
costs. Developing or modeling the mesh of finite elements 
representing the platform and its various design features is an 
important part of the design work, in addition to defining load 
situations and entering the data representing them into the 
calculations. 
 
5.1. GA in-house 
Norwegian Contractors decided to take responsibility for the GA for 
Sleipner A. This is significant, because it was the first Condeep for 
which NC would stand for the analysis. As an adaptive change, this 
decision represents a move on an adjacent opportunity for which NC 
had prepared itself and that fitted with a conscious strategy and effort 
sustained over the years, to develop turn key capability. NC had 
invested in its in-house GA competence and in software development 
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(PATPRE) for automation of load data inputs (see section 3.2.3). 
Now, with Sleipner A, the opportunity arose to include the global 
analysis in the offer to Statoil as work performed by and under the 
responsibility of Norwegian Contractors, instead of contracting it out. 
In the spring of 1988 Einar Fjøsne produced time budget 
estimates for the global analysis. NC also got an offer for the GA from 
Norwegian Offshore Contractors (NOC), forwarded and signed for by 
Dr. Tech. Olav Olsen. Time budget numbers put to this offer 
amounted to the double of NC’s in-house estimates.  
Furthermore, Veritec, the DNV-company that had done the GA 
on previous Condeep-projects using a software package called 
SESAM-69, was shifting to a newer version SESAM-80. Veritec had 
already ceased to maintain SESAM-69 while designing Gullfaks C. 
Already in that project NC itself had taken responsibility for the 
maintenance work on SESAM-69. NC’s engineers who had 
experience with SESAM-69, considered the new version SESAM-80 
less well developed and tested. They expected SESAM-80 to generate 
more unexpected problems than the NASTRAN-package that they 
themselves had used in ten large studies. Hence, in terms of quality 
assurance – which Statoil wanted NC to take responsibility for – an 
NC led GA using NASTRAN was the reasonable choice (NC 1995: 4-
10). This resonated positively with the fact that the comparison of 
time budget estimates also spoke in favor of NC doing the job in-
house.   
Again, when two alternatives are considered to be equal from a 
technical or engineering perspective, they are in a selectively neutral 
fitness shell and the one that produces or represents a lower 
energy/cost level will be selected. When one is favored on engineering 
grounds, then it would be unreasonable to expect that the less fit and 
more expensive alternative would be chosen. At a higher level of 
description and aggregation, that is, for the company as a whole, doing 
the GA in house would amount to a next step in climbing the 
Condeep-fitness hill. At the level of description of the design team, it 
would be a challenge to do the GA on Sleipner A in-house and see the 
platform actually being built; after years of involvement in ‘studies’, 
in handling Computas’ and Veritec’s GA-output, in QA work and in 
software development. It was a challenge and responsibility that they 
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would not take lightly. They were anxious to demonstrate that NC’s 
strategic investments in GA competence would bear fruit.  
 
5.2 Staffing the adaptive performance system (design 
team) 
Choosing NASTRAN as the GA-software package to be used for 
Sleipner A, effectively excluded involvement of Veritec in the actual 
design work. This implied that NC, for the staffing of the design team, 
would have to draw on its own personnel and on consultants from the 
group of engineering firms in the immediate vicinity of Norwegian 
Contractors. These were people that knew each other well through 
collaboration on previous projects. In addition to its own personnel 
NC hired consultants from Norwegian Offshore Contractors, but also 
from Dr. Tech. Olav Olsen, the engineering firm that would do the 
engineering.  
The sum of the design work was broken down into various 
subsets (modeling of element mesh, running of the program, response 
control, quality assurance) for which the various members of the team 
were responsible. The hired consultants could engage personnel from 
their home company in the execution of the work.  
Given the central position that Norwegian Contractors had 
achieved over the past 15 years, this set of people and companies 
represented one of the top expert environments in offshore 
constructions in concrete in Norway. Located close together in the 
Oslo region, they were not only geographically close together. The 
number of formal and informal links and interactions among the 
participants in this group was high. Some of NC’s personnel held 
positions in one of the subcontracting firms, before moving to NC. 
Some of NC’s younger engineers came from the technical university 
in Trondheim, the interactions with that environment were less 
frequent and intense though. As an adaptive performance system, with 
the specific task of detailing the design of Sleipner A, the design team 
was nested within NC’s project organization for Sleipner A, 
straddling, however, company boundaries.  
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5.3. Approximation, judgment and uncertainty in the 
finite element method (FEM) 
For the purpose of solving practical structural engineering problems, 
in the mid-1950s, a method was introduced that modeled continuous 
structures as if they were composed of discrete, finite, elements or 
building blocks with regular, geometrical shapes: the finite element 
method (FEM)(Clough 1979). These elements were represented by a 
limited number of points, i.e. the corners of a cube. Tensions and 
stresses were calculated for each of these points and interpolated to 
positions in between. Still, for large structures like Condeep-
platforms, the amount of calculations to be performed was enormous. 
It was recognized that the FEM-version was an approximation to the 
continuous real thing. However, supported by elaborate testing of 
results against full-scale tests and numerical calculations using other 
equations and software packages, the method made the job doable. 
The use of the finite element method was well established in the 
offshore industry, both for steel and concrete structures. It had been 
used for all Condeep-platforms. It was taught at the technical 
university in Trondheim and it was approved in national construction 
standards and NPD regulations concerning offshore load bearing 
structures. The industry wide trust in the accuracy of the results that 
could be obtained using the finite element method was reflected in the 
(conditional) allowance of the use of reduced safety coefficients if the 
most unfavorable tolerance limits are taken into account (Petkovic 
1997). 
However, the use of the finite element method was never a plug-
and-play solution. It was not a (deterministic) rule-based procedure. 
Some degree of unpredictability and uncertainty was still inherent in 
the software. The design of the overall element model, covering a 
quarter of the whole (biaxial symmetrical) platform, as well as the 
smaller models for recurring elements like tricells – which were called 
super elements, required experience based engineering judgments. 
Judgments had to be made about the number, size and type of 
elements, and about the allowable degree of irregularity (deviation 
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from perfect geometrical shapes)19 necessary to make the elements 
and super elements fit together in curved shapes and joints.  
Choices made in the FEM had also economic consequences. An 
element represented by 8 points required fewer calculations and 
computer time than 20 point elements. A balance had to be struck 
between the required accuracy of the results, technology at hand, 
hours of labor and costs (Ramstad 1979: 8.1). It was not the case that 
the smaller the size of the elements, the greater the number of 
elements and the more points in an element would give the better 
solution. There was no absolute ban on the use of skewed elements, 
although it was known that some shapes – for example very long 
elements – could produce inaccurate results.  
The behavior of the elements in the GA and in the post 
processing of the GA output in the engineering phase was 
characterized by an optimum. The location of that optimum however, 
was not a matter of mathematical certitude, but of experience based 
engineering judgment. 
 
5.4. Slimming as engineering optimization 
With the advanced design tool of NASTRAN at hand the design team 
for Sleipner A started on an adaptive search for an optimal fulfillment 
of their task: the detailing of the design of a Condeep platform that 
was simultaneously reliable, functional and cost-effective. This was 
very much an optimization process, that is, optimization from an 
engineering point of view. According to Tormod Dyken, one of the 
senior engineers in NC, NC’s management did not put pressure on the 
design team in order to cut corners.  
Engineering optimization was something that the engineers 
involved toke pride in from a professional point of view. Given the 
accuracy of the design tool, why should you have thicker walls than 
needed? Why would you have reinforcement steel where it was not 
required? Reducing the thickness of a wall with 1 cm would result in a 
                                                 
19 A rectangular element would be irregular to the degree that angles deviate 
from 90º. 
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reduction of the amount of concrete necessary for construction that 
alone would already be enormous.  
There was a lower limit though. Workers on the construction site 
required enough space to find room for all the reinforcement steel. 
And a minimum thickness of concrete covering the steel bars was 
required to prevent erosion of the steel by penetrating salts from the 
seawater. However, compared to the Gullfaks platforms, that were 
built under the favorable circumstances of high oil prices and high 
profit margins, there was much to be gained by slimming Sleipner. 
The total volume of water displaced by the GBS would still be the 
same. Slimming would reduce the total weight of the concrete 
structure though, adding to the difference between upward pressure 
and total weight that determines the maneuvering space for loading 
and marine operations. And it would still be in compliance with NPD 
regulations allowing the use of reduced safety margins. 
 
5.5. Smart solutions 
The bearing capacity of a thinner wall depended also on the length of 
the wall. At some point in the optimization process it was discovered 
that, given its thickness, the length of the tricell walls was to long. The 
solution to this problem that was proposed was to go back to the 
model of the element mesh and add a triangular element in the sharp 
tricell corner. The alternative, making the walls thicker again, would 
increase the weight of the GBS and the total amount of concrete again. 
The triangular element filling in the tricell corners solved the problem 
by reducing the length of the tricell walls between its supports. The 
amount of concrete necessary to fill in the corners on the construction 
site was limited.  
 Again there is a choice between two alternatives, but this time 
they were not considered to be equal.  According to Tormod Dyken, 
one of NC’s senior and experienced engineers, this was considered to 
be a smart solution. Within the immediate environment of the team 
this solution was rewarded, it was positively selected as being a good 
and smart thing to do.  
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The resulting reduction of the number of elements in the tricell 
wall from six to four was considered not to be of any consequence for 
the accuracy of the global analysis20. It was considered to be neutral. 
Furthermore, this solution held its ground in the higher-level internal 
engineering meetings and design review meetings in NC. Neither was 
it selected against in the verifications performed by Veritec or 
Statoil’s SLA-group.  
 
5.6. Increased topside weight 
Statoil awarded the contract for Sleipner A’s topside to Aker 
Engineering. In August 1988, after the signing on the contract on June 
30 and after the completion by NC of the element model, Statoil 
announced that the topside would be heavier than estimated in the 
Concept Report. Statoil forced the design team to go back and redo 
part of the work that had already been performed.  
The increase was larger than the difference between the upward 
pressure produced by displaced water and the total weight of the 
structure. It also consumed the maneuvering space that the slimming 
had added. Increasing the total volume of the GBS, and hence, the 
volume of displaced water, could solve the problem. The only feasible 
way to do that, without affecting the geometrical relationships 
between the shafts and the decks, was by increasing the height of the 
cylindrical cells. NC calculated the additional costs for this post-
contract change. Arne Bjørlo, NC’s engineering manager for the 
Sleipner A project, recalls the unwillingness of Statoil to pay that 
price and negotiations for cheaper solutions. Eventually, the height of 
the cell walls was increased with 1 meter21 (NC 1995: 7-8). 
                                                 
20 In hindsight it is possible to identify this reduction of the number of elements 
in the (model of the) wall as an important factor contributing to the 
underestimation of shear forces in the GA. But was there a mistake or error in 
the primary process? 
21 I have not been able to establish whether this 1 meter increase of the 
cylinders’ height restored the ‘manoeuvring margins’ to previous levels or 
whether this 1 meter was ‘just enough’. In the latter case, any proposal that 
would increase the weight would find itself in a negative selection environment.  
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5.7. Skewed elements 
Not every proposal put in writing by the design team was applauded. 
Notes from internal meetings reflect proposals that were rejected, 
either on technical grounds or on grounds of additional costs or work 
that they would entail. The environment in Norwegian Contractors 
was selective. 
In October 1988 Dr. tech. Olav Olsen put the degree to which 
irregular or skewed elements were used in the element model (in the 
top domes of the cells and in the tricells) on the agenda. The skewed 
elements would entail two weeks of extra work in the preparation of 
the post-processing of the GA results in the engineering phase (NC 
1995: 7).  
Verification reports from Veritec expressed concern about the 
consequences of irregular (long and narrow) elements for the accuracy 
of the GA results (NC 1995: 18). The design team responded to these 
concerns by initiating special verification activities performed by 
Grosch and Brekke, consultants from Norwegian Offshore 
Contractors, responsible for verification and response control.  
Again, the finite element method was not a rule based, 
deterministic activity. There was no general and absolute ban on the 
use of irregular elements, violation of which would have constituted a 
recognizable error. What was the team’s frame of reference for 
judging which irregular elements should be corrected, and to what 
degree, and where would they be of no consequence? The obvious 
place to look for a frame of reference is within the team itself: their 
experiences, the preparatory work performed, the tools they use, the 
books they had on the book shelf.  
NASTRAN itself did not prohibit the irregular elements used in 
the model, although it had internal functions that would not allow the 
use of very irregular elements. According to NASTRAN manuals the 
usability of irregular elements depended on the angle between the 
sides of the rectangle. H.G. Schaeffer’s 1982 MSC/NASTRAN Primer; 
Static and Normal Modes Analysis, a study on computerized 
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technology (3rd edition), the book that in NC was used as a handbook 
for users of NASTRAN, concluded that: 
General good results are obtained for skew angles up to 45 degrees. 
For larger angles the results deteriorate rapidly’ (cited in NC 1995: 
19). 
The irregular elements used in the tricell element model had angular 
deviations of 13 and 26º, hence considerably less than 45º.  
Some of the engineers in the design team had experiences from 
designing steel structures in which similar skewed elements were 
used. Although steel is not concrete and material matters, the use of 
skewed elements as such was not new, and concerning the 
significance of the degree of skewedness in relation to the material 
(concrete or steel) there was no standard. 
The handbooks that some of the younger engineers in the team 
had used during their training at the technical university of 
Trondheim, books authored by the leading academic FEM 
environment in Norway, did address the issue of skewed elements 
with much emphasis. If there was a shape that was of concern, it was 
the very long and narrow element, defined not by angles but by the 
ratio between the sides. These were the elements that Veritec’s 
verification reports referred to. 
Perhaps more important, in preparation of his verification 
activities Brekke reviewed the design and verifications reports of 
Gullfaks C. Skewed elements similar to the ones used in Sleipner had 
also been used and approved in the top domes of the cells in Gullfaks 
C. 
Grosch and Brekke reviewed all the instances in which skewed 
elements were used in the model for Sleipner A.  They proposed 
several instances, i.e. in the top-domes of the cells, in which the 
degree of irregularity should be reduced. Grosch and Brekke’s 
proposals were discussed in the team against the background of 
experiences and knowledge of the state of the art they had. The degree 
of irregularity in the tricells was not considered to be of consequence 
and thus remained. In other words, with respect to the skewed 
elements in the tricells this process that explicitly focused on skewed 
elements was selectively neutral. Neither were they selected against in 
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subsequent checks and verifications performed internally in NC or by 
Veritec or Statoil. Just like the hole in the top-dome of the tricells,, the 
slim walls, the filled in tricell corner, also these skewed elements in 
the tricell walls were retained throughout the directed movement of 
the project through the various adaptive performance systems and 
workplaces.   
 
NC’s design team completed the global analysis two months behind 
schedule. The rationalization of loading data input with PATPRE 
didn’t pay off. Repair work on the program and manual data input 
delayed the design process, in addition to the delays caused by the 
extra work generated by the post-contract increase of the weight of the 
topside and the corrective work associated with skewed elements. 
Although too late, they achieved performative closure for their part of 
the job. The project could now be transferred to the next adaptive 
performance system for the engineering of the platform, work to be 
performed by Dr. tech. Olav Olsen. 
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Chapter 6 
Sleipner A: Engineering 
 
Engineering is the procedure through which the results of the global 
analysis are translated into dimensions and placement of 
reinforcement steel bars, drawings and material lists. To a large degree 
this procedure is also computerized. Engineering comes ‘after’ the 
global analysis and the software package used is called POST. As one 
of the deliverables of the GA the design team produced a printed 
report that was subjected to final internal and external design revisions 
and past the test. In the printed report not all results could be visually 
displayed. Only a selection of typical design details and loading 
scenarios were displayed visually in graphs. Much of the GA results 
remained hidden in digital data batches and send over directly to Dr. 
tech. Olav Olsen (OO) who would do the engineering, using the GA 
results as input data for their own post-processing software package, 
POST. The output of POST would indicate where the strength of the 
concrete alone would be sufficient and where reinforcement steel had 
to be inserted. 
 
6.1. Rationalizing on drawings and reinforcement 
OO had done the engineering for all previous Condeep platforms. 
Although the firm was the obvious candidate for the work, for every 
new project a new contract had to be negotiated with NC. Against the 
background of the renewed cost awareness in the industry, in March 
1988, OO offered some suggestions on how they could rationalize the 
engineering part of the work. Here too some adaptive changes were 
made. According the Tore Olsen and Kåre Hæreide at OO the 
company knowingly signed the contract based on the conviction that 
the quality of the work would not be compromised from an 
engineering point of view. 
One of the suggestions that were incorporated in the contract 
was a substantial reduction in the number of drawings to be produced. 
A drawing of a tricell for example would visualize the tricell’s 
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geometry and dimensions in a horizontal plane, including the shape 
and placement of reinforcement steel in a maximum situation, that is: 
in a situation in which all of the various bars would be present. No 
separate drawings would be made for situations (i.e. in other vertical 
levels of the tricell) in which not all of these bars would be present. A 
list representing vertical levels would indicate the number of bars to 
be placed per meter. Such a list could contain zero’s, indicating that 
some bars would not be present at some levels. According to Olsen 
and Hæreide, this was not unusual. In sites where the strength of the 
concrete was sufficient to resist the expected loads there would be no 
reinforcement steel. Neither would the absence of reinforcement steel 
be obvious in the maze of steel on the construction site, where the 
specific problem and skill of the workers consisted in finding room for 
all the steel that had to fit in. 
Olsen and Hæreide recalled a proposal to place a minimum 
amount of reinforcement steel at every level, irrespective of the result 
of the GA and post-processing. After discussion the proposal was 
rejected. It was selected against; and by now it is easy to understand 
why. It would require additional steel and incur extra costs. It would 
add weight to the GBS, and weight had become a critical issue 
following the post-contract increase of the topside weight. Slimming 
had reduced the space available in the walls, and finding room for the 
steel was always a problem on the construction site. And finally, 
confidence in the accuracy of the results of the GA and post-
processing, confidence in the software and computer tools that were 
used in the design and engineering, supported the judgment that extra 
bars really were not necessary. 
 
6.2. T-headed bars 
A first version of drawings of the tricell produced by OO showed the 
typical bicycle handlebar shaped reinforcement bar in the tricell 
corner; that is, the (inherited) solution to the Statfjord A problem (of 
crack formation in the tricell corner) that carried over in subsequent 
Condeep designs.  
During the engineering process OO received a letter from NC 
asking whether straight T-headed bars produced by Metalock 
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Industrier A/S could be used instead. According to Tormod Dyken, 
who worked for Metalock before moving to NC, these T-headed bars 
were the result of a continuous process of product development and 
innovation in the field of high performance concrete construction and 
reinforcement. They were specifically designed and tested to 
withstand out-of-plane shear forces in heavily loaded building floors, 
offshore platforms and bridges. They are easier to place and handle 
than bend bars and stirrups. NC had used some 80.000 T-headed bars 
in Gullfaks C (Berner et al. 1991). NC had still an unused batch on 
stock at NC’s construction site in Stavanger. OO checked the usability 
of these T-headed bars and found them to be appropriate. Again, 
engineering judgment and economic considerations resonate to 
positively select a proposed design change that is considered to be an 
improvement.  
The next version of drawings showed the new T-headed bars, 
placed – like the runs of a ladder – in line in the vertical plane. Neither 
the use of the bars nor their arrangement was selected against in 
internal or external design review and verification procedures. There 
was no reason to object to them. Hence, they were retained; also in 
subsequent verifications by Veritec, for which Statoil’s Sleipner A 
project group specified the work orders and assigned the budgets. 
There still was: NO ERROR! 
 
The set or network of people and companies in Oslo involved in the 
design and engineering of Sleipner A had successfully achieved 
performative closure and passed through all quality checks that it was 
exposed to. Drawings and lists of materials could now be sent to the 
construction site at Hinna in Stavanger. The design contained a 
number of features, changes when compared with previous platforms, 
through which the design migrated or drifted slightly on its fitness 
landscape. However, there was no indication that it had drifted 
towards or outside the boundaries staked out by the Concept Report. 
The drift produced in the adaptive search for an optimal design 
remained within what Kauffman (1993) called a selectively neutral 
fitness shell, the boundaries of which were constituted by locally 
relevant criteria for good work, by local credit and reward processes 
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within the design team and approval in and through the formal internal 
and external quality assurance procedures. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
 
7.1. The final selection environment 
At NC’s construction site at Hinna in Stavanger Sleipner A was built 
according to specifications, drawings and material lists received from 
the engineering offices in Oslo. Tools employed shape the 
understanding of the construction one is designing and building. For 
experienced construction workers a Condeep platform consists of the 
physical shapes and volumes of steel and concrete; not of tensions and 
stresses and computer generated data and plots. At the construction 
site no one could have observed something out of the ordinary.  
There was NO ERROR there either. Not until the completed 
concrete structure sprang a leak during the controlled ballast operation 
in preparation of deck mating. The physical environment of the water 
in Gandsfjord constituted the final selection environment. The full and 
uncontrolled force of the water column on the walls of the tricells 
produced a crack that propagated around the T-shaped ends of the T-
headed bars and through the thickness of the wall into a shaft. The 
formation of the crack probably shifted tensions in the whole circular 
shaft wall, producing cracks in one or two other adjacent tricell walls.  
The holes in the top-domes of the tricells allow for the influx of 
a continuous flow of water, only constrained by the diameter of the 
hole. More water surged into the shaft than the ballasting pumps could 
handle. This is a typical Perrowian complex interaction, defined as 
‘those of unfamiliar sequences, or unplanned and unexpected 
sequences, and either not visible or not immediately comprehensible’ 
(Perrow 1984/1999: 78). A design change that was considered to be an 
improvement, or at least neutral and convenient, in the process of 
elaborating the Concept Report, interacted unexpectedly with the size 
of the crack. The absence of a controllable device to restrict the influx 
of water contributed to the loss of the platform. Perhaps with such a 
device the platform could have been kept afloat. It is impossible, 
however, to say whether it would have been possible to repair the 
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platform. Sleipner A was evacuated. It capsized and sank, imploding 
on its way down before hitting the seafloor. 
 
7.2. What are the lessons to be learned? 
Alert Gaard, Statoil’s engineering manager on the Sleipner A project – 
received a phone call from the company’s site representative at Hinna 
‘with the unbelievable news that what never could happen had 
happened’ (Gaard 1992: 3). Up to the moment of the loss there had 
been no error, not in the primary process. To the contrary, Statoil’s 
Sleipner A group, NC and its subcontractor Dr tech Olav Olsen had 
produced an optimized Condeep platform. In the process they adapted 
successfully to the changes in economic marked conditions and to an 
unforeseen increase in topside weight.  
The errors were reconstructed in secondary processes of post-
accident investigations in which investigators knew about the 
disastrous outcome. In their report reviewing quality assurance 
procedures Jersin and Søreide (1997: 40) drew explicit conclusions:  
The identified faults which originated in engineering and verification 
should in theory have been prevented by the parties’ QA systems. 
Given that the errors were made, the QA systems should have detected 
the errors and subjected them to non-conformance control and 
corrective actions, before significant conclusions arose. 
In theory, yes, and given the errors, yes, the QA systems should have 
detected the errors. But there were no errors. Jersin and Søreide also 
concluded that, 
[o]n the whole, the formal QA requirements stated to the parties were 
in accordance with common practice within the trade at the time. The 
reason that the errors in calculation and location of reinforcement 
were not detected in spite of this, was that the QA systems were not 
adequately implemented and followed up by the parties. … In 
particular this element [Design Reviews] have obviously not 
functioned as intended. (Jersin & Søreide 1997: 40 - 1) 
NC was criticized for not following up completely the comments in 
verification reports concerning the use of skewed elements. They 
removed some but left others, that turned out to be fundamental errors. 
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NC should have removed all skewed elements. But, there was no 
absolute ban on skewed elements and each and every instance 
required and received experience based engineering judgment. In 
hindsight, yes, NC has learned something about the behavior of the 8-
node elements – and the degree of irregularity – used in the 
NASTRAN and POST. According to Tormod Dyken, they also 
learned – after and through the accident – that the optimal number of 
elements in the tricell wall was six, and that filling inn the corners of 
the tricells with triangles – the smart solution - effectively reduced the 
number of elements to four, shifting the GA away from its optimum. 
This account of the Sleipner A GBS Loss demonstrates the 
limitations of approaches emphasizing the eradication and control of 
errors, or more generally deviations. It also demonstrates the 
limitations of an accident investigation approach focusing exclusively 
on deviations from formal rules and regulations, and of a managerial 
policy focusing exclusively on the management of compliance. In 
adaptive performance systems there will always be deviations from 
formal regulations, because the protocol does not describe how 
practice works. Most of the time, deviations have nothing to do with 
the causal sequence of events leading to an accident. In practice, it 
might be hard to determine what constitutes a deviation, when 
adaptive changes are considered to be neutral, just convenient, or even 
smart. Or it might be hard to determine (in first order processes) what 
the rule is. Or as Law points out in a study of the Ladbroke Grove 
train accident, deviations from formal safety regulations may be 
necessary to ‘repair’ the frictions between divergent organizational 
goals (regularity, profitability, reliability and safety) and keep the 
‘wheels’ turning. 
I side with Rasmussen (994: 22) where he states that ‘rather than 
to aim at the control of errors, we should seek to control adaptation so 
as to move into a more safe practice’. This is where the challenge is. 
How can you control the migration in your practice when a) you don’t 
know whether the drift that you consider to be uphill in terms of 
fitness, or b) towards lower-energy/cost states when choices are equal 
in terms of fitness, is c) also a drift towards the boundaries where 
failure is imminent, perhaps not in the selection environment 
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constituted by the formal QA procedures, but in a physical selection 
environment further downstream? 
Rasmussen speaks of the migration being subject to gradients, an 
effort gradient and a cost gradient. In NC there is no evidence of 
consistently choosing the options requiring the least effort. In an 
environment in which every working hour has to be accounted for, 
effort and cost are not far apart. Time budgets translate directly into 
economic costs influencing the profitability of the project. The 
transfer of 29,9 % of Statoil’s share in the Sleipner license to the 
‘direct financial interest of the Norwegian state’, the drop in oil prices 
and offshore cash flow and profit margins, combined with the tight 
time schedule due to the pre-arranged contracts on delivery of gas 
from a field that had not yet been developed, have produced in the 
case of Sleipner A a cost gradient. Although, I would rather call it a 
regularity gradient, because it is produced by our energy intensive 
societies’ requirements for a regular production and delivery of fossil 
fuel energy sources; and our economy’s craving for quick returns on 
investments. Perhaps it is better to say that in a commercial and 
competitive field as the offshore industry, a regularity gradient is 
always present. The 1985/6 drop in oil prices increased the gradient: it 
made the slopes of the energy landscape on which Sleipner A was 
moving steeper, influencing the selective environment in NC and 
Statoil in the sense that cost-reducing adaptations would be favored 
even more, and that cost-enhancing proposals would find it even 
harder to survive.  In terms of a fitness landscape, the shape of the 
fitness hill that Sleipner was climbing became narrower with steeper 
slopes, increasing the system’s or project’s vulnerability. On these 
steeper slopes deviations away from a virtual optimum would have 
greater impact in terms of the systems ability to cope with the 
unpredictable consequences of adaptive changes in the geometry of 
tricell models. These unpredictable consequences were rooted in the 
software’s inherent uncertainty and in the method’s approximate 
nature. Early design decisions to remove the mechanical outfitting of 
tricells – resulting in an open hole in the top dome – robbed the 
system of its ability, or better, the possibility to recover from the crack 
formation in the tricell/shaft wall. 
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The relationship between the deteriorated economic climate and 
Sleipner’s failure is not straightforward. It was not a simple trade off 
between reliability and profit. NC wasn’t cutting corners. Yet, the 
resonance between solutions that were considered sound and smart by 
engineers with the project management’s concern about budgets and 
profitability, produced an environment in which more cost-effective 
solutions would be valued, credited and rewarded positively, even 
more so after the 1985/6 drop in oil prices. Resonance or correlation 
is, according to Marion (1999), the way in which an organization, or 
groups within an organization, map their environment and adapt to it. 
Drift, that was considered to be moving uphill, occurred not because 
management put pressure on the design team to produce cheap and 
substandard work. It occurred as a natural adaptive process aiming for 
excellent performance. 
Can organizations monitor this optimization-induced drift along 
a regulatory gradient and develop mechanisms to control it and move 
towards reliable practices, as Rasmussen puts it? Here is a conundrum 
to which there are no easy answers. The paradoxical nature of the 
failure mechanism – failure through optimization with no errors being 
present in the primary process – requires a paradoxical approach. 
Snook formulates it pointedly in his study on the accidental shoot 
down of US Army helicopters by US Airforce F15 fighters over 
Northern Iraq (Snook 2000). ‘Did you shoot down any friendly 
helicopter lately?’ Did you loose any Condeep platforms lately? If the 
answer is NO, when your overall performance is up to standard, 
excellent perhaps, that does not imply that you have not drifted into a 
more vulnerable zone. Or that improved practices are equally reliable 
compared to previous projects, because your new ways of doing might 
be more vulnerable due to changes in the regularity gradient that have 
changed the fitness and energy landscape on which you are moving. 
Excellent performance should be the subject of intensive scrutiny. 
Question your basic assumptions about the sources of your success. 
Look for the ways in which you have become vulnerable, despite or 
perhaps due to your successes. For any quality control procedure these 
will be the hard cases. Try to identify the various levels of selection 
environments in your line of work. Try to assess the range in which 
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they are selectively neutral and assess the extent to which they 
overlap.  
There is another and related lesson we can draw from this 
account of the Sleipner A GBS Loss. Standards of good work emerge 
in and are particular to (the highly interactive network of people and 
companies that constitute) adaptive performance systems. We know 
from science and technology studies that there are no universal 
standards that are independent of situated practices. All knowledge 
and experience is situated. What companies that are performing well 
should do is have somebody venture into other situated practices 
actively searching for standards that are dissimilar from one’s own; to 
question what is taken for granted at home. 
 
7.3. Postscript: meeting contractual obligations / 
achieving performative closure 
The loss of Sleipner A constituted a considerable set back in the 
Sleipner field development. Confident that the cause of the failure had 
been identified it was decided to build a new gravity base structure 
Sleipner A2 basically following the original design. Sleipner A2 was 
made thicker again and the details of the tricell corners were 
improved. The results of the global analysis were checked, ironically 
enough, by manual calculations. Full scale tests were conducted 
before entering into the next loading situation; a procedure that would 
never have survived in the pre-accident environment in which 
Sleipner A1 was designed. Apparently the loss of Sleipner A1 shaped 
a quite different fitness and energy landscape for Sleipner A2, 
protecting it from the direct influence of the regularity gradient. The 
decks were temporarily placed on dummy shafts so that the loading of 
the installation and accommodation modules could proceed. Fully 
completed decks were then mated to the new GBS. Statoil had to 
make adaptive changes to other offshore infra-structural projects (like 
the Zeepipe to Zeebrugge in Belgium) in order to secure gas that could 
replace the Sleipner gas. In 1992 Alert Gaart (1992), who now had 
moved on to the position of Statoil’s project director on Sleipner, 
could - with confidence in the company’s ability to achieve 
performative closure - state that: 
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It is my firm believe that we will meet our objective to provide the gas 
as committed by 1. October 1993. 
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